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This Note argues that the Security Council has not met its responsibility to restore interna-
tional peace and security in Bosnia, and that it therefore must rescind Resolution 713 as it pertains
to Bosnia. Part I provides a background of the events surrounding the outbreak of conflict in
Bosnia, and introduces the standard by which the United Nations may preempt a member state’s
right to self-defense. Part I also presents the international human rights documents that are rele-
vant to the conflict. Part II examines U.N. attempts to restore international peace and security in
Bosnia. Part III argues that the continuation of massive human rights violations necessitates that
the United Nations either immediately and effectively implement its resolutions, or lift the arms
embargo and permit Bosnia to exercise its Article 51 right to self-defense. This Note concludes
that the Security Council’s failure to restore international peace and security and to satisfy the
Article 51 criteria for terminating a member state’s right to self-defense undermines the ability of
the United Nations to respond to future conflicts.
THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA




The ability of the United Nations to respond effectively to
regional conflicts has been directly challenged by the conflict in
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina ("Bosnia").' On September
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University.
1. See BAMAAJELAvicH, 2 HisToRy oF THE BALKANS 296 (1989). The Northwest
Balkans are populated by a majority of South Slavs who share a common literary lan-
guage. Id. at 7. They are divided, however, by religion: Croats and' Slovenes are Catho-
lic, while Serbs are Eastern Orthodox. I& Many Christians converted to Islam during
the five centuries of Ottoman rule. I& at 1-2. During World War II,Josip Broz Tito led
a multi-ethnic army of communists, known as the Partisans, against the Nazi-puppet
state of Croatia and a Serb-dominated army defending the Serb-dominated Kingdom of
Yugoslavia. Id. at 264-69. Under Tito, the Partisans played a decisive role in defeating
the Axis forces and their allies. Id. at 267-87. After World War II, in an attempt to heal
national strife, Tito organized the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into six federal repub-
lics: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Id. at
296.
Copyright 0 1995 by the New York Times Co.
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25, 1991, the U.N. Security Council2  ("Security Council")
adopted Resolution 713, which imposed an arms embargo on
the republics of the former Yugoslavia.4 By imposing this arms
embargo, which prevented Bosnia from exercising its inherent
right to self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,- the
Security Council assumed the responsibility for taking effective
measures to end the conflict and to restore international peace
and security in Bosnia.6
For the last three years, the Security Council has issued reso-
lutions intended to end the bloodshed and bring the combatant
parties to the negotiating table, with little success." Despite re-
peated Security Council resolutions demanding an end to
human rights abuses and all hostilities, the conflict and the ac-
companying violations of international human rights law have
coritinued unabated.8 In response to the inability of the Security
Council to enforce its resolutions and, therefore, to restore in-
ternational peace and security in the territory of the former Yu-
During the Cold War, Tito suppressed nationalist movements within Yugoslavia. Id. at
395-401. After Tito's death in 1980, however, a rotating national presidency was estab-
lished to govern the federal repubilc. Id. at 403-05. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzego-
vina is comprised of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, who, prior to the current conflict, lived
in mixed communities. Id. at 400. Use of the terms "Bosnian Serbs" and "Serb forces,"
in this Note, only refers to those Serbs who have aligned themselves with the effort to
carve independent Serb-states out of Bosnia and Croatia.
2. See U.N. CHARaa art. 23. Article 23 provides the composition of the Security
Council. Id. The Security Council is responsible for maintaining international peace
and security. I. art. 24(1).
3. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Resolution 713].
4. Id.; see Htsrma WATCH, WAR CRMS IN Bosiu-HratRcEovNA 23 (1992). The
six republics of the former Yugoslavia are Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mace-
donia, Serbia, and Montenegro. Id.
5. U.N. CHARTER art 51. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inher-
ent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attacks occurs. against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures nec-
essary to maintin international peace and security." Id.
6. See Resolution 713, supra note 3, at 3.
7. Roger Cohen, U.N. Commander Set to Leave Bosnia, After a Year of Tkiumph and
Disaster, N.Y. Tndns,Jan. 22, 1995, § 1, at 6; Roger Cohen, West FindingSerbs Call the Shots
Even if Few Are Fired, N.Y. TIs, Jan. 14, 1995, § 1, at 3 [hereinafter Serbs Call Shots];
Barbara Crossette, At U.N., Thoughts About Bosnia But No Action, N.Y. TMEs, Dec. 9, 1994,
at A12 (hereinafter Thoughts About Bosnia].
8. Roger Cohen, Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at
Al [hereinafter Conflict in the Balkans]; Roger Cohen, FightingErodes Cease-Fire in Bosnia,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1995, at A8 (reporting 1500 rounds of tank, artillery, and mortar
fire into civilian community over one weekend) [hereinafter Fighting Erodes Cease-Fre).
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goslavia, the General Assembly adopted several resolutions urg-
ing the Security Council to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.'
This Note argues that the Security Council has not met its
responsibility to restore international peace and security in Bos-
nia,10 and that it therefore must rescind Resolution 713 as it per-
tains to Bosnia.11 Part I provides a background of the events sur-
rounding the outbreak of conflict in Bosnia, and introduces the
standard by which the United Nations may preempt a member
state's right to self-defense. Part I also presents the international
human rights documents that are relevant to the conflict. Part II
examines U.N. attempts to restore international peace and se-
curity in Bosnia. Part III argues that the continuation of massive
human rights violations necessitates that the United Nations
either immediately and effectively implement its resolutions, or
lift the arms embargo and permit Bosnia to exercise its Article
5112 right to self-defense. This Note concludes that the Security
Council's failure to restore international peace and security and
to satisfy the Article 51 criteria for terminating a member state's
right to self-defense undermines the ability of the United Na-
tions to respond to future conflicts.
I. CONFLICT IN BOSNIA AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
Serbian nationalist maneuverings, intended to elevate the
Republic of Serbia to a hegemonic status within the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia, led the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia to
simultaneously declare independence."8 Convinced that it could
9. GA. Res. 48/88, U.N. GOAR, 48th Sess.,at 1, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/88
(1993) [hereinafter General Assembly Resolution 48/88]; Provisional Verbatim Record
of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Forty-Seventh Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.3247 (1993); GA. Res. 49/10, U.N. GOAR, 49th Sess., at 6, 1 22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
49/10 (1994) (hereinafter General Assembly Resolution 49/10].
10. See U.N. CHARER art. 51. Article 51 recognizes a member states' inherent
right to self-defense "until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security." Id.
11. See Resolution 713, supra note 3. The Security Council imposed an arms em-
bargo on all the republics of the former Yugoslavia to further the establishment of
peace and stability. IM at 3, 1 6.
12. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
13. Blaine Harden, Yugoslav Army Attacks Slovenia, Meets Resistance at Border Posts,
WASH. Posr, June 28, 1991, at Al. Slovenia and Croatia were the former Yugoslavia's
most prosperous republics, and wanted to distance themselves from hard-line Commu-
nist Serbia. Id.
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not survive in a federal republic dominated by a nationalist Ser-
bia, Bosnia declared independence. 14 In response to the out-
break of conflict between Croatia and Serbia when Croatia tried
to assert her independence, the United Nations imposed an
arms embargo on the republics of the former Yugoslavia. 15 Be-
cause the arms embargo terminated Bosnia's Article 51 right to
exercise self-defense, the United Nations took measures in-
tended to maintain international peace and security within Bos-
nia.1" Despite the adoption of U.N. resolutions mandating the
observance of basic human rights, these measures failed to pre-
vent the widespread commission of human rights atrocities, pri-
marily by Bosnian nationalist Serbs, in violation of international
human rights law.' In response to the apparent widespread vio-
lation of human rights throughout the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights appointed a
Special Rapporteur to investigate and report on the abuse.' 8
A. Background of Events Leading to the Independence of Bosnia
The anti-communist revolutions that engulfed Eastern Eu-
rope in 1989 and the consequent collapse of the Soviet Union
precipitated a nationalist renaissance throughout Eastern and
Southern Europe. 9 This political wave of nationalist self-deter-
mination resonated within the various ethnic and religious
populations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and stirred
14. NOEL MALCOLM, BosNw A SHoRT HISTORY 230 (1994).
15. Resolution 713, supra note 3, at 1-3, pmbl., 1 6.
16. Id- at3, 16.
17. Seventh Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 51st Sess., Item 12, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1995/4 (1994) [hereinafter Seventh Report].
18. Report of the CommissiOn on Human Rights on its First Special Session, U.N. Commis-
sion on Human Rights, 1st Special Sess., Agenda Item 4, pmbl, It 12, 41, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1992/S-1/8 (1992) [hereinafter First Special Session].
19. Stojan Cerovic, The Rise of Serbian Nationalism, 26 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & Po. 527
(1994); Vjekoslav Radovic, Eastern Europe: Upheavals in Eastern Europe Mark End of Com-
munism Says Dfilas, Reuters News Service, Dec. 31, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, News File (reporting Milovan Dgjlas' forecast of communist demise due to anti-
communist upheavals across Eastern Europe); see Albania Albanian Leader Dismisses Un-
rest Reports, Denounces Yugoslavia, Reuter News Service,Jan. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News File (reporting Soviet reforms unleashed waves of popular unrest
throughout Eastern Europe); Peter Humphrey, Romania: Balkans Seek to Heal Riffs and
EnterEurope, Reuter News Service, Oct, 23 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News
File (reporting that communism's collapse in Eastern Europe unleashed nationalist and
ethnic turmoil in Southeastern Europe).
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long-suppressed aspirations for independence. 20 In response to
this international ideological transition, from states founded on
communism to states based on national identity,2' Yugoslav
Communist Party bosses attempted to preserve their power and
status by recasting themselves as national and cultural revival-
ists. 22 No Communist Party official was able to more effectively
make this transition than the leader of the Serbian Communists,
Slobodan Milosevic.23
By the Summer of 1989, Slobodan Milosevic had fomented
nationalist sentiment throughout Serbia, and in doing so be-
came the nation's most popular figure. 24 Milosevic planted him-
self firmly in the nationalist camp when he delivered a speech at
the site of the Battle of Kosovo to celebrate its six-hundredth
anniversary.2  At the gathering, icon-style posters of Jesus,
Prince Lazar,26 and Slobodan Milosevic were offered for sale.27
Flanked by black-robed priests of the Orthodox Church, singers
in traditional Serbian dress, and security police in dark suits and
sunglasses,28 Milosevic told the crowd that the Serbian people
were yet again engaged in a battle, and that it might someday
become an armed battle.29 In addition to his increasingly ag-
20. MALCOLm, supra note 14, at 214; seeJohn Tagliabue, Conflict in Yugoslavia, N.Y.
TimEs, July 3, 1991, at A6 (describing political successors in Yugoslavia as former com-
munists who evoke old national aspirations).
21. Klas Bergman, Yugoslav President Calls for Talks, CumwuN SCi. MoNrrOR, Feb.
9, 1990, at 3. At an emergency session of the Yugoslav parliament, the Yugoslav Presi-
dent observed: "Nationality has been placed above everything else and has become
more important than democracy, economic success, and individual human rights." Id.
22. Marlise Simons, Upheaval in the East; Yugoslavia Catching East Europe's Political
Fever, N.Y. Tmams, Jan. 21, 1990, § 1, at 1 [hereinafter Upheaval in the East].
23. MALCoLM, supra note 14, at 211; see Peter Bale, Romania: Muted Nostalgia for the
Hard Old Men of Communism, Reuter Textline, Nov. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News File (reporting how only Milosevic survived Eastern Europe's upheaval
against Balkan communist leaders); AIeksa DUlas, A Profile ofSlobodan Milosevic, FOREIGN
AwF., Summer 1993, at 95 (discussing Milosevic's ideological transition from commu-
nism to nationalism).
24. MALcoLM, supra note 14, at 213.
25. Id. Kosovo, site of the old Patriarshia and other Serbian orthodox monas-
teries, is considered by many the "cradle of Serbia." Cerovic, supra note 19, at 528 &
n.4. In popular Serb myth and folklore, the Serb defeat at the battle of Kosovo in 1389
represents the beginning of Turkish rule. Id.
26. MALcouM, supra note 14, at 213. Prince Lazar led Serbian troops against Turk-
ish forces in the Battle of Kosovo. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 213; MIsHA GLENw, THE FALL op YuaOsLAViA 35 (1993).
29. Slobodan Milosevic, Slobodan Milosevic Addresues Rally at Gazimestan, Brit. Broad-
casting Corp., June 30, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. "After six
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gressive rhetoric, 0 Milosevic continued to consolidate his power
within Serbia. By eliminating the autonomous status of certain
territories within Serbia,31 and by filling key Politburo positions
with his own loyalists, 2 Milosevic controlled enough votes to sin-
gle-handedly rewrite the federal constitution.-3 Milosevic's con-
solidation of power, in combination with his antagonistic rheto-
ric, 4 worried the other republics within Yugoslavia that he might
try to institutionalize Serbia's dominance within the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia. 5
By the Fall of 1989, Slovenia had prepared for Milosevic's
impending constitutional coup.3 6 Legislators in Slovenia passed
a new Slovenian constitution that established the supremacy of
Slovenian law over Yugoslav law, and that explicitly declared Slo-
venia's right to secede.3" In the Spring of 1990, Slovenia held
multi-party elections, which produced a liberal-nationalist coali-
centuries, we are again engaged in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles,
but this cannot be excluded yet." IM.
30. MALCOLM, supra note 14, at 214. Because Milosevic encouraged the use of anti-
Croat rhetoric, official Serb media began to use the World War II Croatian fascist name
"Ustasa" to refer to leading Croatian Communists. ML
31. Peter Humphrey, Serbs Threaten Mass Protest at Communist Paty Plenum, Reuters
News Service, July 25, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. In 1974, Tito
drafted a new Yugoslav constitution that granted the Serbian provinces of Vojvodina
and Kosova autonomous status. Id. Serbs regard Kosovo as the birthplace of their eth-
nic heritage. Jonathan S. Landay, Serbian President at Odds With Other Yugoslav Republics,
UPI, June 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. Currently, Kosovo is
populated by 1.7 million Albanians and 200,000 Serbs. Id.
32. Blaine Harden, Balkan Elections Signal Failure of "Yugoslavism", WAsH. Posr,
May, 1, 1990, at A14 [hereinafter Failure of "Yugoslavism1]. After Milosevic installed a
puppet government in Kosovo, protest demonstrations by ethnic Albanians were vio-
lently suppressed by Serbian police. Id
33. MALCOLM, supra note 14, at 211-12.
34. Yugoslav Police Ty to Prevent Flareups Between Ethnic Groups, Cuic. TPaB., Aug. 18,
1990, at 9 (reporting strong support by state-run media in Serbia for Croatian Serbs and
characterization of Croatian government as fascist and racist). Milosevic's Serbian me-
dia intensified attacks on the Croatian government with references to Croatian fascism
and Croatian guilt for crimes committed against Serbs during World War II. SABRINA
RvAir, NAIONALiSM An FEDERALSM IN Yurost.ArA, 1962-1991 244 (2d ed. 1992).
35. Failure of "Yugoslavism", supra note 32, at A14; see Andrej Gustincic, Albanians
Boycott Kosovo Battle Anniversaty as Serbs Celebrate, Reuters News Service, June 28, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File (discussing Slovenia and Croatia's fear that
Milosevic wanted to restore Serbia's dominance in Yugoslavia).
36. JAMES Cow, LErmMACy AND THE M Arru.v THE YucoslAv Ciusts 78-94 (1992);
MALCOLM, supra note 14, at 214 (discussing Slovenian anticipation and preparation for
constitutional challenge by Milosevic).
37. BRANxA MACos, TE DESrRUCrION or YuGosLAviA 224-25 (1993).
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tion government.3 8
Croatians, meanwhile, were also preparing for Milosevic's
anticipated constitutional maneuvering during the Fall of 1989.
Croat citizens of Croatia had been particularly encouraged by
the emergence of nationalist independent states throughout
Eastern Europes9 and, on April 22, 1990, elected the nationalist
party, led by Franjo Tudjman, to power.40 Between August 19
and September 3, 1990, however, Croatian Serbs living in the
Krajina4 region of Croatia held a local referendum on auton-
omy in defiance of the Croatian government. 42 The federal
army troops, with their Serb-dominated officer corps and strong
loyalty to Milosevic, Belgrade, and the Serbs, 43 assisted Croatian
Serb militias as they began to patrol the region shortly after the
referendum.44 When conflicts between Serb militias and Croa-
tian police escalated in frequency and violence, federal troops
were sent in to maintain order.45 Croatia objected to the federal
army's presence and its apparent aiding of the Serb militias, but
was unable to convince the federal government, dominated by
Milosevic, to remove the troops. 46 In fact, the Croatian Serbs
made a practice of inciting riots in order to justify requesting
38. MALcoLM, supra note 14, at 215.
39. Upheaval in the East, supra note 22, § 1, at 1.
40. Id.; see Blaine Harden, Croatian President-Elact Plans 'Sovereign State, WASH. POST,
Apr. 30, 1990, at A13 (reporting victory by Franjo Tudjman's nationalist party in Croa-
tia's first free election since World War II).
41. Glenny, supra note 28, at 4. Throughout the seventeenth century, the Habs-
burg Empire populated the military frontier, "Krajina in Serbo-Croatian, with Serbs to
protect the Empire from any Ottoman invasion. Id.
42. Jonathan S. Landay, Yugoslavia's Serbs Casts Ballots in Autonomy Referendum, UPI,
Aug. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File (reporting referendum of
600,000 Croatian Serb minority in Krajina region); see Marcus Tanner, Confused Reports
About Violence in Yugoslav City, INzPENENT, Aug. 18, 1990, at 12 (reporting Croatian
police attempts to seal off rebellious region and regain control).
43. SeeJim Fish, Yugoslav Army Upended in Slovenia, WASH. PoST, July 2, 1991, at Al
(discussing federal army domination by Serbs and how it symbolizes Serbian man-
hood); Harden, supra note 13, at Al (reporting federal army officer corps was seventy
percent Serbian); Yugoslav Police Ty to Prevent Flareups Between Ethnic Groups, CM. TRIB.,
Aug. 18, 1990, at 9 (reporting interception of Croatian Interior Ministry helicopters by
federal army jets).
44. MAzcoLm, supra note 14, at 216.
45. Id. at 216; see Fish, supra note 43, atAl (reporting how federal army intervened
to protect rebel Serbs in Croatia from retaliatory attack by Croatian police and army).
46. MALcouM, supra note 14, at 216; see Marcus Tanner, Armed Serbian Uprising
Raises Civil War Fear, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 18, 1990, at 1 (reporting federal army aid to
rebel Serbs and Croatian President Tudjman's insistence that federal army units cease
unauthorized activities within Croatia).
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that federal troops be called in to quell the unrest.47
Meanwhile, in Bosnia, the Communist Party had dis-
integrated and national parties had been formed.48 Elections
held in December 1990 yielded a distribution of parliament
seats roughly proportionate to the populations of the Muslims,
Serbs, and Croats: 41%, 35%, and 20%, respectively. 49 By the
time Alija Izetbegovic's 5' unity government took office in No-
vember 1990,51 the struggle between Serbia and the two inde-
pendence-minded republics of Slovenia and Croatia had intensi-
fied. 2 Indeed, by early 1991, Milosevic was declaring publicly
that if either republic attempted to alter the federal structure of
Yugoslavia, through independence or otherwise, he would seek
to annex portions of Croatia and Bosnia.5" In Ma'y 1991, how-
ever, Serbia provided the watershed event that led to full-scale
conflict by refusing to recognize a Croatian, Stipe Mesic, as the
next holder of the rotating federal presidency.54 Consequently,
on June 25, 1991, both Croatia and Slovenia declared indepen-
dence.-5
After a column of federal army tanks met with well-organ-
ized and stiff resistance in Slovenia,5 8 the tanks withdrew and
turned their attention on Croatia. 7 The federal army had two
strategic objectives within Croatia: (1) to intimidate Croatia as a
whole, and (2) to consolidate the pockets of Serb-populated ter-
47. MalcotM, supra note 14, at 217.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 222.
50. Terry Atlas, US. Set to Recognize 3 Yugoslav Republics, CHI. TuB., Apr. 7, 1992, at
3. Alija Izetbegovic is the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Id.
51. Nesho Djuric, Ethnic Rivalry Threatens Yugoslavia's Bosnia-Hercegovina Republic,
UPI, Oct. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
52. Mm.COLM, supra note 14, at 223.
53. Id.; Vjekoslav Radovic, Serbia to Demand Revision of Borders if Yugoslavia Falls
Apart, Reuter Library Report, June 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, News
File.
54. MALcoLm, supra note 14, at 225; see R.C. Longworth, Yugoslavia's Outlook Dark-
ens as PresidentialDeadlock Perists, Ctu. Tam., May 18, 1991, at 4; Celestine Bohlen, Yugo-
slavia Fails to Fill Preide, N.Y. TmES, May 18, 1991, § 1, at 1.
55. Peter Green, EC nations, other states recognize Croatia, Slovenia, UPI,Jan. 15, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
56. John Tagliabue, Yugoslavia Fails to Oust Militias, N.Y. Tmimsm, June 27, 1991, at
Al; see supra note 43 and acompanying text (reporting how federal army generals un-
derestimated Slovenian resistence).
57. MALco, supra note 14, at 225.
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ritory that were already controlled by armed Serbs.58 By late Au-
gust 1991, Serbia and Croatia were engaged in full-scale con-
flict.5 9 A U.N. negotiated cease-fire between Croatia and Serbia
went into effect in February 1992, establishing "U.N.-protected"
zones around the territory conquered by Croatian Serb and fed-
eral forces.60
When the fighting in Croatia began to abate in January and
February 1992, the United Nations authorized the "withdrawal"
of federal army tanks and artillery into Bosnia.61 Meanwhile, the
Bosnian Serbs had used the winter to construct heavy artillery
positions around major Bosnian towns, including Sarajevo, and
had received large troop reinforcements from the federal
army.62 In light of the massive mobilization of the Bosnian Serbs
and the departure of Slovenia and Croatia as counter-weights to
Serbia within the federal framework, Bosnia declared indepen-
dence.63 On April 7, 1992, the European Community ("EC")
recognized Bosnia as an independent state.6 On May 22, 1992,
Bosnia was admitted as a member state to the United Nations.65
B. U.N. Arms Embargo and the Article 51 Right to Self-Defense
The United Nations was chartered to achieve several pur-
poses: to maintain international peace and security, to develop
friendly relations among nations, and to promote cooperation in
58. Id.
59. Id. at 226.
60. Id. at 230.
61. Id.; see Hugh Pain, After EC Recognition, Search For Yugoslav Peace Set to Resume,
Reuter Library Report, Dec. 17, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File (re-
porting Bosnia's intent to declare independence if its neighbors left Yugoslavia).
62. Bosnia-Hercegovina Serbs Declare Independence Referendum 'Void, UPI, Jan. 27,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File; MALcouM, supra note 14, at 227. The
Interior Minister of Serbia and the federal army had been steadily arming the Bosnian
Serbs, so that by the time they requested "protection" they were already well armed. Id.
63. MALcorM, supra note 14, at 230.
64. James Gow, One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Library Research Rep., June 4, 1993, at 1.
65. MALcOiM, supra note 14, at 243. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Suc-
cession of States in Respect of Treaties provides that the obligations and rights of prede-
cessor states bind their successors, making the continuity of obligations the rule. Vi-
enna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 28, 1978, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 80/31 (1978). The Bosnian Government is in control of only thirty per-
cent of its territory, while the Bosnian Serb authorities have effective control of approxi-
mately seventy percent of Bosnian territory, and have declared an independent state,
Republika Srpska. 2 Himsmnu WATCH, WAR CRiums mi BosNu-&HRzEoovmA 9 (1993).
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solving international economic, social, cultural and humanita-
rian problems.6" The Charter of the United Nations ("U.N.
Charter") established six principal organs of the United Nations,
among them the General Assembly and the Security Council.67
The Security Council's adoption of Resolution 713,68 on Septem-
ber 25, 1991, imposed an arms embargo on Bosnia. 69 While the
U.N. Charter contains a general prohibition on the use of force
by individual member states,70 Article 51 guarantees every mem-
ber state the right to exercise individual or collective self-de-
fense.7 1
1. The United Nations: Constituent Bodies and Their
Jurisdictions
The General Assembly consists of all the member states of
the United Nations. The General Assembly is empowered by
the U.N. Charter to discuss,73 consider,7 4 and make recommen-
dations to other constituent bodies of the United Nations on any
subject, including issues concerning the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security.75 In addition, the General Assembly
may recommend measures for the peaceful resolution of situa-
tions that it deems likely to impair friendly relations among na-
tions.76 The General Assembly, however, may not make any rec-
ommendations regarding disputes that are either before the Se-
curity Council, or upon which the Security Council is exercising
its chartered functions.77
The Security Council is comprised of fifteen members of
the United Nations: five permanent members,7 8 and ten non-
66. U.N. CHARTE art. 1.
67. I& art. 7.
68. Resolution 713, supra note 3, at 3, 6.
69. Id.
70. U.N. CHART art. 2(4).
71. Id. art. 51."
72. Id. art. 9(1).
73. Id. t. 10.
74. Id. art. 11(1).
75. Id. art. 11(2).
76. Id. art. 14.
77. Id. art. 12(1).
78. Id art. 23(1). The five permanent members of the Security Council are China,
France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (inherited by the Russian Federation),
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. Each permanent member has the
power of a veto over all Security Council measures. IM
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permanent members who are elected to two-year terms.79 The
Security Council, on behalf of U.N. members, bears primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity. 0 Upon the determination of a threat to international
peace, the Security Council has the power to exercise both eco-
nomic and military force to maintain international peace and
security.8'
2. Security Council Resolution 713
On September 25, 1991, the Security Council adopted Reso-
lution 713, which prohibited the importation of arms and mili-
tary equipment to the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. s2
The Security Council, however, has continued to enforce the
arms embargo against Bosnia since its independence.85 The Bos-
nian government has argued that, as a result of Resolution 713,
its right to self-defense is being denied. 4
3. Article 51: The Exception to the General Prohibition on
the Individual Use of Force
The U.N. Charter contains a general prohibition on the use
of force by individual member states without U.N. authoriza-
tion.8 - As the exception to this prohibition, Article 51 provides
for an inherent right to individual and collective self-defense
when an armed attack occurs against a member.8 6 There are no
cases, however, that offer an interpretation of the scope of Arti-
79. Id. art. 23(2).
80. I& art. 24(1).
81. Id arts. 24(2), 39.
82. See Resolution 713, supra note 3, at 2, 16. Under the provisions of Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter, in order for the Security Council to impose an embargo on a
member state it must determine the existence of an Article 39 "threat to international
peace and security." U.N. CHARTR art. 39.
83. Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721, at
7, 1 33, U.N. Doc. S/23363 (1992). This Note does not examine the argument that the
United Nation's recognition of Bosnia as an independent U.N. member state should
exempt Bosnia from any restrictions imposed by the Security Council on the former
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its constituent states.
84. Provision Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Forty-
Seventh Meeting, supra note 9, at 9-17.
85. U.N. CHARTRa arts. 2(4), 39-48.
86. Id. art. 51. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security." I&
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cle 51's grant of an inherent right to self-defense.8 7  Conse-
quently, the International Court ofJustice's 8 ("ICJ") interpreta-
tion of Article 51 as a part of customary international law in Nica-
ragua v. United States 9 provides the sole starting point for an
analysis of Article 51.90 The ICJ, however, only interpreted the
first clause of Article 51, which provides the criteria required for
a state to exercise its inherent right to self-defense.9 1 The ICJ
did not address the second clause9" of Article 51, which qualifies
this right to self-defense. 93 Consequently, the standard that the
Security Council must meet in order to deprive a member state
of its Article 51 right to self-defense remains in question. 4
In Nicaragua,9  the ICJ held that in order to exercise the
right to individual self-defense, a state must be the victim of an
armed attack. 8 The ICJ went on to examine the nature of acts
that can be classified as "armed attack.19 7 The ICJ held that an
"armed attack" occurs when one state sends or sponsors an
armed band, mercenaries, or irregulars that commit acts of force
against another state, thereby presenting a threat comparable to
that of a regular force.9
87. SeeJane A. Meyer, Collective Self-Defense and Regional Security: Necessay Exceptions
to a Globalist Doctrine, 11 B.U. INT'L LJ. 391, 392-99 (discussing generally accepted inter-
pretations of Article 51 in absence of definitive interpretation by ICJ).
88. U.N. CARTR art. 92. The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. I&
89. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America), 1986 I.CJ. 14 (Merits and Judgment) [hereinafter Nicara-
gua].
90. Id. at 92. The Court interpreted the language of Article 51 "nothing in the
present Charter shall impair," to mean that a state's right to exercise self-defense is part
of pre-existing customary international law. Id.
91. I. at 93-95.
92. U.N. CHARTR art. 51. The second clause of Article 51 provides that a member
state has the right to exercise self-defense "until the Security Council takes the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security." Id.
93. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing Article 51 as exception to
general prohibition against individual use of force). The second clause of Article 51
provides: "until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." Id.
94. See Meyer, supra note 87, at 398-400 (interpreting second clause of Article 51,
terminating states' right to exercise self-defense, in absence of ICJ interpretation).
95. Nicaragua, 1986 I.CJ. 14.
96. Id. at 93.
97. Id.
98. Id. The Court, quoting from Article 3, paragraph (g) of the Definition of Ag-
gression annexed to General Assembly Resolution 3314, held that-
"armed attack" means 'the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
882 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:870
The ICJ, in Nicaragua, also held that any state that is at-
tacked must request assistance in order for another state to exer-
cise collective self-defense on behalf of the attacked state.99 This
request for assistance must follow the state's declaration that it is
under attack.100 The state's right to self-defense terminates
when the Security Council fulfills the terms of Article 51's sec-
ond clause by "tak[ing] the meaures necessary to maintain inter-
national peace and security."101
The ICJ has not interpreted the meaning of the Article 51
clause that terminates a member state's right to exercise self-de-
fense. 102 Thus, this clause can be interpreted using any one, or
combination of, the four generally accepted schools of treaty in-
terpretation: (1) textual,10 (2) systematic,104 (3) intentional, 10 5
and (4) teleological. 106 The textual school employs a "plain
meaning" reading of ambiguous words within their immediate
context, without looking to the intent of the drafters. 107 The sys-
tematic school keeps within the "four comers" of the document,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to' (inter alia) an actual armed at-
tack conducted by regular forces, 'or its substantial involvement therein.'
Id.; see GA Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 143, annex, arts. 1-4,
U.N. Doc. A/3314 (1974) (defining "armed aggression").
99. Id. at 94.
100. Id. at 95; see U.N. Admits Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia, LA TIMES, May 23,1992,
at A6. While speaking before the General Assembly, Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris
Silajdzic declared, "[w]e call on this body to come to our aid in-the hour of our greatest
need." Id.; Elaine Sciolino, Bosnian Asks G.O.P. Lawmakers to Help End Arms Embargo,
N.Y. Tiirs, Jan. 31, 1995, at A3 (reporting Bosnian Prime Minister's lobbying Congress
to lift arms embargo on Bosnia if United Nations is unable to get Bosnian Serbs to
agree to peace plan).
101. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (presenting text of second clause of
Article 51 terminating right to exercise self-defense).
102. See Meyer, supra note 87, at 398-400 (interpreting second clause of Article 51
in absence of ICJ interpretation); U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("until the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.").
103. 1 GEORO SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANuAL OF INrERNAnONAL LAw 153 (4th ed.
1960).
104. 1 Id. at 153-54.
105. 1 I& at 154.
106. 1 Id.; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31,
1980 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58, 18 (Cmnd. 7964), 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92. The four methods
are implied in the language of Article 31. See id. (describing general rule of treaty
interpretation).
107. 1 ScHw~azNBRiGER, supra note 103, at 153; see 1 L. OPPENHEiM, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw: A TRFAmsE 952 (8th ed. 1955) (indicating that terms in treaty must be
interpreted according to their usual meaning in everyday life, barring their use for
technical meaning).
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and gives words a meaning that is consistent throughout the en-
tire document.108 The intentional school looks to the intentions
of the parties at the time of signing."0 9 The teleological school
of interpretation focuses on the purpose of the treaty over
time.110
C. International Human Rights Treaties
Due to the military hardware and troop support provided by
the federal army, nationalist Serb forces in Bosnia quickly cap-
tured seventy percent of Bosnian territory."' While capturing
territory, the Bosnian Serb army engaged in human rights viola-
tions, commonly known as "ethnic cleansing.""12 Although nu-
merous international instruments prohibit the mistreatment of
civilians in areas of conflict and military combatants, there are
two common problems in enforcing international human rights
treaties: (1) treaties often require that the state that is host to a
violation enforce the provisions of that treaty, and (2) perpetra-
tors of human rights violations frequently elude apprehension
and thereby escape prosecution by third-party states.11 3
108. 1 ScfwAzmBERGER, supra note 103, at 153-54.
109. 1 I. at 154. It is a well established rule in international law that prepatory
papers (traveaux preparatoires) may be used to determine the intentions of drafting
parties. I OpPENmHIM, supra note 107, at 957.
110. 1 SCHWARZENBERGxR, supra note 103, at 154.
111. Roger Cohen, Serbs Close in on Bosnian Town; U.N. and NATO Unable to Act,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al [hereinafter U.N. and NATO Unable to Act]; see General
Assembly Resolution 48/88, supra note 9, at 3, 1 5 (condemning continued supply of
military arms, equipment, and services to Bosnian Serb paramilitary units by Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)).
112. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Teritory of the Former Yugoslavia,
U.N. Secretary-General, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/48/92 and S/25341 (1994) [hereinafter Re-
port on Human Rights]. The term "ethnic cleansing" refers to the Bosnian Serb forces'
policy of harassment, discrimination, beatings, torture, rape, summary executions, ex-
pulsions, shelling of civilian population centers, relocation of populations by force, con-
fiscation of property, and destruction of homes and places of worship conducted with
the intent to drive non-Serb populations from conquered territory. Id.; Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territony of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, 1st Special Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9
(1992) (hereinafter First Report].
113. RicHAD B. LnIjcH, Im'riotLw. HuMAN MG3rrs 177 (2d ed. 1991). Be-
cause the United Nations cannot intervene in a state's domestic jurisdiction, treaty en-
forcement is left to the signatory state. Id. at 576-604.
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1. Treaties Requiring States to Enforce Human Rights
Violations Within Their Borders
Several international human rights treaties, to which. the
former Yugoslavia was a party, address the variety of atrocities
that are being committed in Bosnia, primarily, though not exclu-
sively, by the Bosnian Serbs.114 The majority of international
human rights treaties, however, speak to "States Parties,""' not
individual actors within a state's territory.1 6 Consequently, the
signatory state bears the responsibility for taking measures to en-
force the various articles of each agreement, and to see that per-
sons within that state's territorial jurisdiction are held accounta-
ble.1 17
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrim-
ination Against Women" 8 orders states to eliminate any distinc-
tion, exclusion, or restrictions of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any
other field on the basis of gender." 9 A report authorized by the
European Community concluded that at least 20,000 Muslim wo-
men had been raped during the Bosnian Serb conquest, and
that some of these rapes had occurred in special detention cen-
ters set up for women and children. 120 Muslim women were
found to comprise the overwhelming majority of rape victims in
the conflict.12
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 2 2 orders states to
prevent acts of torture in any territory under their jurisdic-
114. Seventh Report, supra note 17, at 4 (reporting Bosnian Serb massive violations
of human rights as not comparable to violations committed by government forces);
Roger Cohen, CA Report on Bosnia Blames Serbs for 90% of the War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1995, at Al.
115. INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGrS, supra note 113, at 177.
116. Id. The language "States Parties" identifies the signatory state as the obligor
under the provisions of the treaty, not the individual. Id.
117. Id. at 177-78.
118. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.LM. 33 (1980).
119. Id. art. 1, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16, 19 1.L.M. at 36.
120. Roy GuTmAN, A WITES TO GENOCIDE 146 (1993).
121. Id.
122. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984), 1991 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 107 (Cm. 1775).
1995] BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND ARTICLE 51 885
tion,123 to include torture as an offense under their criminal
law,124 and to punish offenses with penalties appropriate to the
severity of the crime.'2 Article 1 defines torture as the inten-
tional infliction of pain or suffering, either physical or mental,
by a person acting in an official capacity for purposes of intimi-
dation, coercion, or for any reason based on discrimination.126
Article 2 provides that a state of war does notjustify the use of
torture.
127
The Convention on the Rights of the Child128 orders states
to give the best interests of the child primary consideration 29
and to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the survival and
development of the child.'30 James P. Grant, the Executive Di-
rector of United Nations Children's Fund ("UNICEF"), in a let-
ter to the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights dated
February 25, 1993, stated UNICEF's position in response to the
violations of the rights of women and children in the former Yu-
goslavia.13' Grant drew particular attention to the prevalent use
of rape of women and girls by soldiers as a weapon of war.' 2
Grant's letter cites reports compiled by the Commission on
Human Rights, which assert that the rape of women and girls is
widespread, and that persons in positions of authority do not
intervene, or attempt to stop the rapes. 3 In fact, some authori-
123. Id. art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 at 3, 1991 Gr. Brit T.S. No. 107 at 3.
124. Id art. 4(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 at 4, 1991 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 107 at 4.
125. Id. art. 4(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 at 4, 1991 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 107 at 4.
126. Id. art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 at 3, 1991 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 107 at 3.
Article 1 (1) defines "torture," in part, as: "any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted ... for such purposes as intimidat-
ing or coercing.., or for any reason based on discrimination... when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by ... a public official, or other person acting in an official capac-
ity." Id.
127. Id. art 2(2), U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46 at 3, 1991 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 107 at 3.
128. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/
25, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 44 (Cm. 1976).
129. Id. art. 3(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 at 5, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 44 at 4.
130. Id. art. 6(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 at 6, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 44 at 4.
131. Letter dated 25 February 1993 from the Executive Director of United Nations
Children's Fund to the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Commis-
sion on Human Rights, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/107
(1993) [hereinafter Letter from UNICEF Executive Director].
132. Id. at 2.
133. Id.
(Tihey (the team of experts) heard of no attempts made by anyone in a posi-
tion of authority to try and stop the raping of women and girls. In fact, some
of those in power actively participated in it... Rape of females has encom-
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ties actually participated in the raping of women and girls.1 3 4
Grant cited the sections of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child where the violations have been most egregious, particu-
larly: (1) the right of children to be protected from discrimina-
tion and punishment based on status or a parent's beliefs,' (2)
the right of children to be protected from all forms of physical
and mental abuse, 3 6 (3) the right of children to a standard of
living adequate for healthy development,"" (4) the right of chil-
dren to be protected from exploitation and sexual abuse,3 8 (5)
the right of children to be protected from torture, cruel or de-
grading treatment,3 9 (6) the right of children to be protected
from unlawful or arbitrary deprivation of liberty,' 4 and (7) the
right of children to have their human rights protected during
passed the entire age spectrum, from children to elderly women, in all areas of




135. Id. at 3. Article 2(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides
that "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is pro-
tected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status,
activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family
members." Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 128, art. 2(2), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 at 5, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 44 at 4.
136. Letter from UNICEF Executive Director, supra note 131, at 3. Article 19, sub.
1, provides that "States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social
and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental
violence, injury or abuse ... including sexual abuse." Convention on the Rights of the
Child, supra note 128, art. 19(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 at 10, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
44 at 7.
137. Letter from UNICEF Executive Director, supra note 131, at 3. Article 27(1),
provides that "States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living
adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development."
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 128, art. 27(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/
44/25 at 14, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No, 44 at 10.
138. Letter from UNICEF Execttive Director, supra note 131, at 3. Article 34 pro-
vides that "States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of exploitation
and sexual abuse." Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 128, art. 34, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/44/25 at 16, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 44 at 11.
139. Letter from UNICEF Executive Director, supra note 131, at 4. Article 37(a)
provides that "[n]o child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment." Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note
128, art. 37(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 at 17, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 44 at 12.
140. Letter from UNICEF Executive Director, supra note 131, at 4. Article 37(b)
provides that "no child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily."
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 128, art. 37(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/
44/25 at 17, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 44 at 12.
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armed conflict.141
2. Treaties Enforceable By Third-Party States
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide 142 ("Genocide Convention") marked the first
effort by the United Nations to combat human rights violations
through a treaty. 4M The Genocide Convention reaches all per-
sons "whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials or private individuals."1 " The Genocide Convention
was drafted to deter and punish those who would engage in acts
of genocide.1 45 Article IV of the Genocide Convention specifies
that any person who commits acts of genocide can be held ac-
countable under the terms of this convention.1 46
Article III of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
141. Letter from UNICEF Executive Director, supra note 131, at 3. Article 38(4)
provides: "In accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law
to protect the civilian population in armed conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible
measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an armed con-
flict." Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 128, art. 38(4), U.N. Doc. A/
RES/44/25 at 18, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 44 at 12.
142. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 1970 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 (Cmnd. 4421) [hereinafter
Genocide Convention].
143. RicHARD B. LILucH, INTERNATIONAL HumAN RItrrs: PROBLEMS OF LAW, Pox.
icy, AN PRAcncE 178 (2d ed. 1991). Article II of the Genocide Convention defines
genocide as:
any ... acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
142, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, 1970 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 at 4. Article III of the Geno-
cide Convention defines those acts which shall be punishable as:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Id. art. M, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, 1970 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 at 4.
144. Id. art. W, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, 1970 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 at 4.
145. Id. pmbl, 78 U.N.T.S. at 278, 1970 Gr. Brit T.S. No. 58 at 4.
146. Id. art. IV, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, 1970 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 at 4.
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tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War14 articulates the mini-
mum standard for the treatment of non-combatant persons pres-
ent in a conflict not of an international character. 148 Article
3(1) mandates that persons taking no active role in hostilities
must be treated humanely without discrimination, regardless of
racial, social, religious, or economic distinctions. 49 Accordingly,
Article 3(1) prohibits certain acts commonly perpetrated against
non-combatant persons in regions of armed conflict: (1) mur-
der, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture,'50 (2) taking of
hostages,' (3) humiliating and degrading treatment, 1 2 (4) the
passing of sentences without adequate due process of law. 15 3 Ad-
ditionally, Article 3(2) mandates care for the sick and
wounded. 154
D. U.N. Commission on Human Rights Appoints Special Rapporteur
When the U.N. Commission on Human Rights became
aware that Bosnian Serb forces were systematically employing
ethnic cleansing to drive non-Serb populations from Serb-held
regions of Bosnia, the Chairman of the Commission appointed
Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, former Prime Minister of Poland, as
147. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 39 (Cmnd. 550) [herein-
after Geneva Convention].
148. Id,; see LILucH, supra note 143, at 776-79 (providing background leading to
adoption of Geneva Convention).
149. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 147, art, 3(1), 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 39 at 216.
Article 3(1) provides, in part, that: "Persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circum-
stances be treated humanely without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria." Id.
150. Id. art. 3(1) (a), 75 U.N.T.S. at 290, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 39 at 216. Article
3(1) (a) prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutila-
tion, cruel treatment and torture." Id.
151. Id. art. 3(1)(b), 75 U.N.T.S. at 290, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 39 at 216.
152. Id. art. 3(1) (c), 75 U.N.T.S. at 290, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 39 at 216. Article
3(1) (c) prohibits "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and de-
grading treatment" Id.
153. Id art. 3(1) (d), 75 U.N.T.S. at 290, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 39 at 216. Article
3(1) (d) prohibits "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of execution without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judi-
cial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." Id.
154. Id. art. 3(2), 75 U.N.T.S. at 290, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 39 at 216-18.
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Special Rapporteur.1 15 The Special Rapporteur was instructed
to make recommendations for ending human rights violations,
and to gather information on possible human rights violations
that may constitute war crimes. 156 According to reports filed by
the Special Rapporteur, violations of human rights committed in
Bosnia have been grave and pervasive.1 57
II. U.N. ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE INTERNVATIONAL PEACE
AND SECUREIy
Within the first few weeks of Bosnia's recognized indepen-
dence, the federal army and Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces
captured more than sixty percent of Bosnian territory.1 58 This
quick victory was largely attributed to the federal army's contri-
bution of approximately 100,000 troops, weaponry, and a con-
stant supply of ammunition, food, and fuel from Serbia.1 59 The
military advantage provided by the federal army's support
proved indispensable to the Bosnian Serb forces' policy of ethni-
cally cleansing non-Serb populations from Serb-held territory.16 0
155. First Special Session, supra note 18, at 2, 13. On August 14, 1992, the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution 1992/S-1/1 which requested its
Chairman to appoint a special rapporteur to "investigate first hand the human rights
situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in particular within Bosnia and Her-
zegovina." Id.
156. Id. at 5.
157. Tenth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Terfitoiy of the Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 51st Sess., Item 12, at 5-6, 11-12, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1995/ 57 (1995) [hereinafter Tenth Report]; Ninth Periodic Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territo of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Secretary-General,
49th Sess., at 5-6, 21, U.N. Doc. A/49/641,and S/1994/1252 (1994) [hereinafter Ninth
Report]; Eighth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territoq of the Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. Secretary-General, 49th Sess., at 6, U.N. Doc. S/1994/967 (1994)
[hereinafter Eighth Report]; Seventh Report, supra note 17, at 1; Sixth Periodic Report of the
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/110 (1994)
[hereinafter Sixth Report]; Fiflh Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Te7i-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Commission on Human rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item
12, at 4-5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47 (1994) [hereinafter Fiflh port]; First Report,
supra note 112, at 2.
158. MALcorm, supra note 14, at 238.
159. Id. at 239.
160. Id. at 239-40. The Bosnian government, unprepared to mount a military de-
fense of its territory, had a defense force numbering only 3500 in the spring of 1992.
Id. at 240. It was estimated, in September 1992, that the Bosnian government army
possessed only two tanks and two armored personnel carriers ("APCs"). Id at 243. By
contrast, the Bosnian Serb forces possessed 300 tanks, 200 APCs, 800 artillery pieces,
and 40 aircraft. Id.
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The reports compiled by the Special Rapporteur for the Com-
mission on Human Rights catalogued the widespread human
rights violations that occurred during the conflict.161 Since the
Security Council terminated Bosnia's Article 51 right to self-de-
fense under Resolution 713,162 it has passed numerous resolu-
tions, each constituting an element of the three-year effort to
restore international peace and security in Bosnia. 63 On Febru-
ary 21, 1994, the Special Rapporteur issued a report which ex-
amined the effectiveness of U.N. efforts to address the human
rights violations in Bosnia, and also made recommendations for
both the enforcement of present resolutions and the drafting of
future resolutions. 164
A. A Catalogue of Human Rights Violations
Since the Special Rapporteur began collecting evidence of
human rights abuses in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, he
has documented the commission of human rights violations on a
massive scale. 5 To the extent that he has been able, the Special
Rapporteur has travelled throughout the various republics of the
former Yugoslavia in the performance of his mandate. 166
Throughout his fourteen periodic reports, 167 the Special Rap-
porteur has focused on those violations committed most perva-
161. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 43-44.
162. Resolution 713, supra note 3, at 3, 1 6. On September 25, 1991, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 713, which provides "under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace'and
stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implemnt a general and complete embargo on all
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia." Id.'
163. See General Assemby Resolution 49/10, supra note 9, at 1-4, pmbl. (noting
that relevant Security Council resolutions, intended to restore international peace and
security, have not been implemented).
164. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 43-53.
165. First Report, supra note 112, at 11. The Special Rapporteur, in his first peri-
odic report to the Commission on Human Rights, concluded that "[m]assive and grave
violations of human rights are occurring throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herze-
govina." I&
166. Letter Dated 15 September 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1066 (1994). The Special Rap-
porteur responded to comments made by the government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) which criticized his sixth periodic report. Id. at 4.
In his letter, the Special Rapporteur defended the objectivity of his reports, and noted
that the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was obstructing the Special
Rapporteur's efforts to perform his mandate in Serbia and Montenegro. Id.
167. Tenth Report, supra note 157, at 29-31.
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVNA AND ARTCLE 51
sively in Bosnia, including: terrorization of civilians,168 deten-
tion,1"9 ethnic cleansing,"' rape,' military attacks on civil-
ians,1 72 and interference with the delivery of humanitarian
aid. 1 1
1. Terrorization of Civilians
The Special Rapporteur reported that the terrorization of
civilians was most prevalent in areas controlled by Bosnian Serbs
and Bosnian Croats.' 74 The Special Rapporteur also noted that
the campaign of civilian terrorization was particularly intense in
the Banja Luka region1 75 of Bosnia, which is held, primarily, by
Bosnian Serb forces."'7 Additionally, the Special Rapporteur re-
ported that there was an escalation in the rate of ejecting Bos-
nian Muslim and Croat tenants from their apartments between
November 1993, and March 1, 1994.77 Apparently, a "housing
agency" facilitated the allocation of apartments to incoming
Serb displaced persons by selecting accommodations and then
evicting the Muslim or Croat tenants. 7 8 Accompanying this
threat of eviction, Muslim residents of the Banja Luka area were
also victims of frequent shootings, assault, threats and robber-
ies. 179 At the time of the Special Rapporteur's report, 202
mosques and twenty-one percent of Roman Catholic buildings in
the Banja Luka diocese had been razed.' 80 The Special Rap-
porteur concluded that the authorities of Banja Luka were at-
tempting to eliminate all traces of the Muslim and Croat com-
168. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 5-7.
169. Id. at 8.
170. Id. at 9-10.
171. Id. at 11.
172. Id. at 11.
173. Id. at 12.
174. Id at4.
175. Id. at 5. Banja Luka is a region of Bosnia populated by a Serb majority. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. This "housing agency" reputedly received payments for its services in the
form of possessions left behind by the previous occupants. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.; see FTflh Report, supra note 157, at 14. In the Special Rapporteur's fifth
periodic report, he reported that "[flive out of six mosques in Serb-held Bieljina and
almost all mosques in Banja Luka were reportedly blown up in 1993. Eyewitnesses
claimed that the demolition was systematic and the sites were quickly replanted with
trees." Id.
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munities.' 8 '
2. Detention
According to the Special Rapporteur, in 1993, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross'8 2 visited 200 detention cen-
ters and 16,900 detainees held throughout Bosnia.' During de-
tention, thousands of prisoners were executed and many more
were repeatedly raped and tortured.8 4 While all parties to the
conflict have detained persons under poor conditions, 85 and
many detainees have been subjected to forced labor, according
to the Special Rapporteur, neither the Bosnian Croat nor Bos-
nian government forces has orchestrated the practice.' The
Special Rapporteur attributed incidents of forced labor in camps
controlled by these two parties to the initiative of local com-
manders.18 7
3. Ethnic Cleansing
Although the Bosnian government has been accused of at-
tempting to empty certain territory of ethnic Serbs, the Special
181. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 5.
182. LiLICH, supra note 143, at 344. The International Committee of the Red
Cross ("ICRC") investigates and reports conditions in which prisoners are held during
conflict. Id.; see First Special Session, supra note 18, at 3 (demanding, in Commission on
Human Rights Resolution 1992/S-1/1, that ICRC have unimpeded access to all camps,
prisons, and other places of detention within Bosnia); Report on the Visit to Former Yugosla-
via by a Member of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntay Disappearances, U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 10(c), at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1994/26/Add.1 (1994) (discussing role of ICRC in documenting and locating missing
persons).
183. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 8. According to the Special Rapporteur's sixth
periodic report, "[d]uring 1993 the ICRC visited 16,900 detainees, 14,400 of them for
the first time; 10,440 of those 16,900 were released during the year and some 1000
were removed from the 'active' register by reason of death, escape or for other rea-
sons." Id.
184. Report on Human Rights, supra note 112, at 12-21. The International Tribunal
investigating the commission of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia charged the Ser-
bian commander of the Omarska concentration camp in Bosnia with genocide. Roger
Cohen, Tribunal Charges Genocide By Serb, N.Y. Tnms, Feb. 14, 1995, at Al. Twenty other
Serbian commanders, guards, and visitors at the camp were also charged with war
crimes. Id.
185. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 8. The Special Rapporteur cited international
observers of the detention camps who characterized the camp conditions as "very bad"
when prisoners suffered fron cold, hunger, abuse, and lack of basic necessities. Id
186. Id.
187. Id. at 8.
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Rapporteur concluded that the Bosnian government was not ap-
plying a policy comparable to ethnic cleansing.188 Indeed, in
one report, the Special Rapporteur warned that the Bosnian
Muslim community was threatened with extermination.' 8 9 Ac-
cording to the Special Rapporteur's first report,190 the process of
ethnically cleansing territory followed a common pattern
throughout Bosnian Serb-held territory.191 Witnesses testified
that Serbian extremists forcibly replaced officials who were
moderates or who refused to cooperate with a policy of violence
against Muslims and Croats.' 92 Once authorities sympathetic to
the policy of ethnically cleansing were installed, non-Serb popu-
lations were subjected to harassment, discrimination, and vio-
lence perpetrated by Serbian soldiers and Serbian merce-
naries.1 93 Serbian villagers also participated in acts of violence
against their Muslim and Croat neighbors.'9 4 This violent intimi-
dation has been extensively used to drive non-Serbs out of Bos-
nian Serb-held territory.19 One common form of intimidation
is to direct gunfire at Bosnian Muslim and Croat homes, or to
detonate them by throwing explosives.' 98  Once deciding to
leave, residents were frequently forced to sign documents stating
that they would never return.' 7 Prior to departure, residents
generally sold their homes for whatever price they could get or
turned their keys over to the municipality for "safekeeping."198
The Special Rapporteur also found that Bosnian Muslims and
Groats who remained in Bosnian Serb-held territory were fired
from their public sectorjobs due to their ethnic origin. 9 9 It was
also reported that private shops and businesses owned by non-
188. Frst Report, supra note 112, at 5; see Seventh Report, supra note 17, at 4 (noting
that government forces have been responsible for violations of human rights, though
not on scale comparable with that of Bosnian Serb forces); Eighth Report, supra note 157,
at 7 (reporting ongoing commission of ethnic cleansing in areas under control of Bos-
nian Serb forces).
189. Ffth Report, supra note 157, at 36.
190. First Report, supra note 112, at 5.
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Serbs were burned and looted.2 0 0 According to the Special Rap-
porteur, Bosnian Serb forces continue to engage in the practice
of ethnic cleansing throughout Bosnia.201
4. Rape
The Bosnian Serb army has sponsored rape as a tool for eth-
nically cleansing territories under its control. 02 In his most re-
cent report, the Special Rapporteur concluded that the war in
Bosnia continues to be characterized by the widespread rape and
sexual abuse of women, committed primarily, though not exclu-
sively, by Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces.20 3 In addition,
the Special Rapporteur concluded that the de facto Bosnian
Serb authorities had continued their policy of ethnic cleansing
during the entirety of his mandate.20 4 Indeed, the Special Rap-
200. Id.
,201. Ninth Report, supra note 157, at 20. The Special Rapporteur found that the
Bosnian Serb forces were engaged in their largest campaign of ethnic cleansing since
the summer of 1992. Id. The Special Rapporteur also noted that reports of continued
ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serb forces were received from locations throughout Bos-
nia, such as: Prjedor, Rogatica, Bijeljina and Banja Luka. Eighth Report, supra note 157,
at 7.
202. MALCOLM, supra note 14, at 245 & n.27. According to a team of experts sent
to the former Yugoslavia by the Special Rapporteur "[r]ape has been used as one
method to terrorize civilian populations in villages and forcing ethnic groups to leave."
Report on Human Rights, supra note 112, at 72. In their report, the team of experts
described an example of how Bosnian Serb forces use rape as a tool of ethnic cleansing.
Id Serb paramilitary units would enter a village and publicly rape several women, so
that word of the rape would spread throughout the village and create a climate of fear.
Id. Several days later, the federal army would enter the village offering safe passage out
of the village to all non-Serbs. Id. Male villagers who otherwise might stay and try to
defend the village, seize the opportunity to escape the village and protect their women
and children from being raped. Id. In January 1993, European Community investiga-
tors compiled a report in which they concluded that Serb forces had raped "up to
20,000 Slavic Muslim women and girls in Bosnia as part of a systematic policy of terror
designed to intimidate, demoralize, and drive them from their homes." William
Drozdiak, Serbs Raped 20,000 EC Team Says, WAsH. PosTJan. 9, 1993, at A12, A17; Rape
Goes to War, ECONOMISr, Jan. 23, 1993, at 46.
203. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 4-5. The Special Rapporteur, in his report,
states that
[w]ar continues unabated in Bosnia and Herzegovina and continues to be
characterized by wholesale violation of human rights and of humanitarian law.
Whole populations remain victim to terrorization and harassment, particu-
larly, though not exclusively, on territory controlled by Bosnian Serb and
Bosnian Croat forces.... The commission of rape and other forms of sexual
abuse against women continues.
204. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 44. In his report, the Special Rapporteur con-
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porteur found, that the Bosnian Serb army established and main-
tained detention centers for the sole purpose of sexually abusing
young women.205
5. Military Attacks on Civilians
The Special Rapporteur concluded that the Bosnian Serb
forces continued to target civilians throughout the areas in
which they were fighting.206 The Special Rapporteur expressed
particular concern for Bosnian Serb offensives against the U.N.
safe areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorazde. 2°1 During the month
ofJanuary 1994, residents of Sarajevo were subjected to 1000 in-
discriminate shelling and rocket attacks from Bosnian Serb posi-
tions, per day. 0 8 Meanwhile, in Tuzla, Bosnian Serbs forces re-
peatedly attacked residents with cluster bombs and anti-person-
nel rockets, producing many casualties.20 9 In Gorazde, the
Bosnian Serb forces conducted an offensive that included the
deliberate targeting of civilian areas, including hospitals and hu-
manitarian supply routes.210 Most of the fatalities associated with
the offensive were caused by direct mortar and missile attacks on
the city.21' Weapons of greater destructive force, however, were
cluded that "[d]uring the whole period of the Special Rapporteur's mandate the policy
of 'ethnic cleansing,' initiated by the defacto Bosnian Serb authorities, has continued
unabated." Id.
205. Ffth Report, supra note 157, at 6. The Special Rapporteur found that young
women were detained in Bosnian Serb army barracks, which served as brothels. Id.
Additionally, 100 young women, aged 15 to 17, were held in the "Westphalia" coffee
house for purposes of sexual abuse. Id.
206. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 11.
207. Id.
208. Id. While the Special Rapporteur noted that some of the Bosnian Serb shell-
ing was retaliatory for government attacks launched from the city, he concluded that
most were indiscriminate. I& UNPROFOR was unable to establish the origin of a Feb-
ruary 5, 1994, mortar attack on a Sarajevo marketplace that killed 68 civilians and
wounded 200. Id.
209. Id. at 11-12. In December 1993, the Bosnian Serbs intentionally targeted the
city's chemical factories, despite the risks this posed to the civilian population. Id.
210. Seventh Report, supra note 17, at 2. The ethnic Serb minority that lived in
Gorazde was not subjected to any significant harassment prior to the Bosnian Serb of-
fensive against Gorazde. Id. Many civilians wounded in the attacks died of their casual-
ties because the medical staff was unable to provide proper care during the hospital's
constant shelling. I& The Bosnian Serbs forces claimed that the hospital was being
used as a "military command centre." Id. Relying on first-hand accounts by interna-
tional observers, the Special Rapporteur concluded that the hospital did not serve any
military function. Id.
211. Id. The Bosnian Serb forces destroyed the water station that supplied
Gorazde, forcing residents to line up for water at wells. Id. at 3. Exposed while waiting
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also used against Gorazde.212
6. Interference with the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid
Interference with the delivery of humanitarian aid has re-
sulted in great hardship for many isolated and besieged popula-
tions.213 Shortages of aid supplies have created tension between
ethnic communities in cities where relations have otherwise
been civil.214 Tensions are exacerbated by the relative success of
local Serb and Croat agencies in arranging for the delivery of aid
from Belgrade and Zagreb, while the local Muslim agencies fre-
quently have their aid blocked by Serb and Croat forces.215
B. Security Council Resolutions
On February 21, 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 743 establishing a United Nations Protection Force ("UN-
PROFOR"). 21 6 UNPROFOR's mission was to facilitate the crea-
tion of a suitable environment for peace negotiations, which
might lead to an overall settlement of the war in the former Yu-
goslavia. 17 In May 1992, however, shortly after UNPROFOR's
arrival within Bosnia, the conflict intensified.1 8
Security Council Resolution 752219 demanded that the fed-
on line, many were killed by sniper fire. Id. The number of fatalities from sniper fire
rose as the offensive progressed. Id. at 2.
212. Id. at 3. These weapons included wire guided missiles and "aerosol bombs."
Id. A Bosnian Serb attack on the Vitkovici chemical plant, which contained ammonium
nitrate, exposed the residents and livestock to health risks. Id.
213. Id. The people of Gorazde were deprived of a mobile hospital while their
own hospital was filled well beyond capacity. Id.; see Eighth Report. supra note 157, at 6
(discussing humanitarian crisis resulting from blockade of humanitarian aid destined
for Bihac); Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 12 (discussing serious shortages of food,
medicines, and basic "winterization" materials resulting from looting of aid supplies
throughout Bosnia)..
214. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 8. Tuzla is a case in point. Id. Tuzla received
only 14.5% of the aid that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
("UNHCR") estimated was necessary to feed adequately its population in December
1993. Id.
215. Id.
216. S.C. Res, 743, U.N. SCOR, 8055th mtg. at 2, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743
(1992).
217. Id. Resolution 743 states that "the [UNPROFOR] should be an interim ar-
rangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiations
of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis." Id.
218. United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, at 5, U.N. Doc. DPI/
1312/Rev. 2 (1994).
219. S.C. Res. 752, U.N. SCOR, 3075th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/752 (1992).
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eral army units within Bosnia be immediately withdrawn, placed
under the authority of the Bosnian government, or be dis-
banded and disarmed.22° In addition, the Security Council
called upon parties to immediately cease the practice of forcing
the expulsion of persons from regions where they live, with the
intention of altering the ethnic composition of a territory's pop-
ulation.221 Despite the Security Council's adoption of Resolu-
tion 752, Bosnian Serb forces continued to receive direct mili-
tary support from the federal army and other irregular forces
originating outside of Bosnia.222 Consequently, on May 30,
1992, the Security Council imposed wide-ranging sanctions on
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to
discourage further military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs, and
to encourage compliance with Resolution 752.223
Taking note of the continued reports of human rights atroc-
ities within Bosnia, including violations of the Geneva Conven-
tion,224 the Security Council, on August 13, 1992, adopted Reso-
220. Id. Resolution 752 states that "those units of the Yugoslav People's Army
(JNA) and elements of the Croatian Army now in Bosnia-Herzegovina must either be
withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or
be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective international
monitoring." I& at 2, 1 4.
221. I& at 2, 1 6. Resolution 752 calls on parties to "ensure that forcible expul-
sions of persons from the areas where they live and any attempts to change ethnic
composition of the population, anywhere in the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, cease immediately." Id.
222. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 3082nd mtg. at 1-3, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/757
(1992). Resolution 757 reiterates the unfulfilled demands made in Resolution 752, in-
cluding:
- that all parties and others concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina stop the
fighting immediately,
- that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina cease
immediately,
- that action be taken as regards units of the [federal army] in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, including the disbanding and disarming with weapons
placed under effective international monitoring of any units that are
neither withdrawn nor placed under the authority of the Government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- that all irregular forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina be disbanded and dis-
armed ....
Id.
223. Id. at 3-6, 11 1-13.
224. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing conduct prohibited
under Geneva Convention).
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lution 771.225 In Resolution 771 the Security Council expressed
alarm at continuing reports of human rights violations, includ-
ing the mass expulsion and deportation of civilians, abuse of ci-
vilians in detention centers, and deliberate attacks on non-com-
batants. 226 In addition, the Security Council strongly con-
demned the practice of ethnic cleansing as a violation of
international human rights law.227 It further demanded that in-
ternational humanitarian relief organizations be granted unim-
peded and continuous access to all prison camps and detention
centers.228
On September 14, 1992, the Security Council adopted Reso-
lution 776,229 which authorized the enlargement of UN-
PROFOR's mandate and strength so that it would be in a posi-
tion to assume primary responsibility for the protection and de-
livery of humanitarian assistance to civilian populations.23 0 The
Special Rapporteur has repeatedly cited the Bosnian Serbs for
their practice of hi acking, harassing, and charging tolls for the
safe passage of humanitarian relief convoys. This interference
has greatly contributed to the shortage of food, medicines, and
fuel for the operations of hospitals in non-Serb civilian commu-
nities.
In response to reports of widespread and systematic deten-
tion and rape of women, particularly Muslim women, in Bos-
nia,231 the Security Council adopted Resolution 798, on Decem-
ber 18, 1992, demanding that all detention camps be immedi-
ately closed.232 This Resolution specifically called for the closure
of camps that detained exclusively women.23 3 In addition, Reso-
lution 798 expressed the Security Council's support for the Eu-
ropean Community's investigations into the alleged widespread
225. S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992) [here-
inafter Resolution 771].
226. Id. at 1, pmbl. In Resolution 771 the Security Council also expressed "grave
alarm at continuing reports of... deliberate attacks on ... hospitals and ambulances,
impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian population, and wan-
ton devastation and destruction of property." Id.
227. Id. at 1, 1 2.
228. Id. at 1, 1 4.
229. S.C. Res. 776, U.N. SCOR, 3114th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/776 (1992).
230. Id. at 2, 1 2.
231. S.C. Res. 798, U.N. SCOR, 3150th mtg. at 1, pmbl, U.N. Doc. S/RES/798
(1992) (hereinafter Resolution 798].
232. Id.
233. Id.
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abuse of women in Bosnia.23 4
In response to Bosnian Serb aerial bombing raids, and the
use of aircraft for other military operations, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 781, on October 9, 1992, banning all mili-
tary flights within Bosnia.23 5 In response to the use of military
aircraft in the March 13, 1993, bombing of two Bosnian Muslim
villages,23 6 the Security Council, on March 31, 1993, adopted
Resolution 816237 authorizing member states to take "all neces-
sary measures" to ensure compliance with the flight ban,2 8 and
authorized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") to
act as the U.N. enforcement arm.23 9 In Resolution 816, the Se-
curity Council determined that the repeated violation of the ban
on military flights in Bosnia constituted a continuing threat to
international peace and security.240
In response to Bosnian Serb attempts to ethnically cleanse
the non-Serb civilian population of Srebrenica,241 the Security
Council, on April 16, 1993, adopted Resolution 819, which classi-
fied the eastern Bosnian town of Srebrenica as a "safe area,"242
and demanded that Bosnian Serb paramilitary units cease their
attacks against Srebrenica.2 43 Noting the recommendations of a
234. Id. at 1, [ 1-5.
235. S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 3122th mtg. at 2, 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/781
(1992) [hereinafter Resolution 781]. Between the time the United Nations began mon-
itoring the flight ban and a March 17, 1993 report on the status of the ban, there had
been 465 reported violations of the "no-fly zone." United Nations and the Situation in the
Former Yugoslada, supra note 218, at 13. The U.N. Secretary-General requested an ex-
planation of the flight-ban violation from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro). Id. The response given the Secretary-General stated that "airplanes
and helicopters of the Air Forces of the Army of Yugoslavia have not violated the air-
space of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the no-fly zone came into effect." Id.
236. Id. at 14.
237. S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 3191st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993).
238. Id. at 2, 4.
239. United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 218, at 14.
Between the establishment of the "no-fly zone" and March 1, 1994, 1484 violations of
the ban had been reported. Id.
240. S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 3191st mtg. at 1, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/Res/816
(1993).
241. S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 3199th mtg. at 2, 1 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819
(1993) [hereinafter Resolution 819]. In Resolution 819, the Security Council con-
demned the Bosnian Serb forces' attempt to "force the evacuation of the civilian popu-
lation from Srebrenica and its surrounding area... as part of its overall abhorrent
campaign of 'ethnic cleansing'." Id.
242. Id. at 2, 1.
243. Id. at 2, 1 2.
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fact-finding mission to Bosnia, 2 " the Security Council, in Resolu-
tion 824 of May 6, 1993, concluded that the critical security and
humanitarian needs of towns in eastern Bosnia necessitated the
extension of the safe area concept. 245 Consequently, in Resolu-
tion 824 the Security Council declared that Sarajevo, Tuzla,
Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac should be treated as safe areas, and
should be free from armed attack.246 On May 25, 1993, the Se-
curity Council adopted Resolution 827,247 which established an
International Tribunal248 to prosecute persons responsible for vi-
olating international human rights law in the territory of the for-
mer Yugoslavia.249
On June 4, 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution
836, which extended the authorized mandate of UNPROFOR to
include the use of force in response to bombardments or armed
incursions into the U.N. safe areas.250 UNPROFOR's new au-
thority to use all necessary means in the defense of safe areas,
however, did not deter the Bosnian Serbs from continuing their
offensive against Sarajevo. To this day, Bosnian Serb snipers
continue to target civilians in Sarajevo, U.N. aircraft operating at
Sarajevo's airport continue to be attacked by Bosnian Serb
forces, public utilities remain turned off, and humanitarian re-
lief supplies continue to be hijacked and blocked.251
On April 22, 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution
913 in response to a ferocious Bosnian Serb offensive against the
244. S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 3208th mtg. at 1-2, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824
(1993) (hereinafter Resolution 824].
245. Id. In Resolution 824, the Security Council considered the "urgent security
and humanitarian needs faced by several towns in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina as exacerbated by the constant influx of large numbers of displaced persons in-
cluding, in particular, the sick and wounded" and the "continuing armed hostilities by
Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against several towns [in Bosnia]" when it decided to
extend the safe haven concept. Id.
246. 1& at 2, 1 3.
247. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [here-
inafter Resolution 827].
248. Id. at 1-2, pmbl., 1 1; Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Secretary-General, annex, art. 1, at 36, U.N. Doc. S/
25704 (1993).
249. Resolution 827, supra note 247, at 2, 11 1-2. In Resolution 827, the Security
Council approved the report of the Secretary-General and established the International
Tribunal. Id.
250. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 3228th mtg. at 3, 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836
(1993) [hereinafter Resolution 836].
251. Aid Slows in Bosnia as Serbs Hamper Convoys, N.Y. Thaws, Mar. 3, 1995, at A7.
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safe area of Gorazde. 2 Resolution 913 condemned the Bosnian
Serbs in the strongest terms for: the shelling and attacks against
Gorazde,25 I attacks against relief workers,254 the harassment and
detention of UNPROFOR personnel,25  and their failure to re-
spect cease-fire agreements, negotiated by representatives of the
United Nations and the Russian Federation, regarding
Gorazde.256 Resolution 913 demanded the release of all U.N.
personnel being held by Bosnian Serb forces, 257 and that UN-
PROFOR's freedom of movement be unimpeded in the per-
formance of all its tasks. 5 8
On September 23, 1994, the Security Council adopted Reso-
lutions 941, 942, and 943 in an attempt to persuade the Bosnian
Serb authorities to accept a peace-plan proposed by the Contact
Group.259 The proposed plan would have divided the territory
of Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Bosnian Serbs and the
Bosnian government, forty-nine percent and fifty-one percent,
respectively.260 The Bosnian government agreed to the Contact
Group peace-plan, while the Bosnian Serb authorities rejected
it.2 6' The adoption of the following resolutions was precipitated
by the Bosnian Serb rejection of the Contact Group's peace initi-
ative. 262
Security Council Resolution 941 condemned the Bosnian
Serb forces for systematically perpetrating a "campaign of ter-
252. S.C. Res. 913, U.N. SCOR, 3367th mtg. at 1-2, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/913
(1994). The Bosnian Serb offensive against Gorazde "resulted in the death of numer-
ous civilians and tremendous human suffering." IM
253. Id. at 2-3, 1 3.
254. Id. at 1-2, pmbl.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 3, 1 5.
258. Id. at 3, 1 6.
259. Roger Cohen, A Case-Fire Called WinterSettles Over Bosnia, N.Y. Timmas, Dec. 22,
1994, at A12 [hereinafter A Cease-Tre Called Winter]. The term "Contact Group" refers
to the United Kingdom, United States, France, Russia, and Germany. Id. Together, the
diplomats of these nations attempted to craft a peace plan that would prove acceptable
to all parties, and might bring about a cessation of hostilities. Conflict in the Balkans,
supra note 8, at Al.
260. Conflict in the Balkans, supra note 8, at Al.
261. Id.
262. S.C. Res. 942, U.N. SCOR, 3428th mtg. at 1-2, It 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/942
(1994).
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ror"218 in Banja Luka, Bijejina and other territory under their
control.2  In addition, Resolution 941 reaffirmed the Security
Council's demand that the Bosnian Serb authorities cease their
campaign of ethnic cleansing,2 5 and that all individuals who
have committed or have ordered the commission of acts of eth-
nic cleansing will be held individually accountable for those
acts.26 6 Resolution 941 further recognized that the International
Tribunal has jurisdiction over serious violations of international
human rights law committed within the territory of the former
Yugoslavia.267 In Resolution 941, the Security Council deter-
mined that the situation in Bosnia continued to constitute a
threat to international peace and security.268
Resolution 942 expressed the Security Council's approval of
the proposed peace-plan drafted by the Contact Group,2 9 recog-
nized that all parties other than the Bosnian Serbs had accepted
the territorial settlement,2 ° and condemned the Bosnian Serbs
for their rejection of the settlement.27: In addition, Resolution
942 demanded that the Bosnian Serbs accept the proposed
peace settlement "unconditionally and in full." 272 Resolution
942 also concluded that the situation in the former Yugoslavia
continued to constitute a threat to international peace and se-
curity.273
Resolution 943 suspended restrictions, prohibiting certain
commercial activities, which had been placed on the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in exchange for
the Republic's apparent closing of the international border be-
tween Bosnia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with re-
spect to non-humanitarian supplies.27 4 The suspension of these
263. S.C. Res. 941, U.N. SCOR, 3428th mtg. at 1-2, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/941
(1994).
264. Id. at 2, 2.
265. Id. at 2, 1 4.
266. Id. at 2, 1 2.
267. Id. at 1-2, pmbl.
268. Id. at 2, 1 2.
269. S.C. Res. 942, U.N. SCOR, 3428th mtg. at 1, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/942
(1994).
270. Id. at 2, 1 2.
271. Id. at 2, 1 3.
272. Id
273. Id at 1, pmbl.
274. S.C. Res. 943, U.N. SCOR, 3428th mtg. at 1-2, pmbl., 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
943 (1994).
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restrictions was made subject to review every 100 days, to ensure
compliance.2 5 Nevertheless, recent events suggest that arms
continue to be smuggled across the border from the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia. 8 According to the Deputy Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister of Croatia, Mate Granic, the Russian-made
surface-to-air missiles ("SAMs") used by the Bosnian Serbs in the
Bihac region against NATO warplanes during the week of De-
cember 1, 1994, were smuggled into the area from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. 2 " Recent U.N. reports have confirmed
that advanced versions of SAMs have recently been distributed to
the Bosnian Serb forces across Bosnia to thwart any potential re-
taliatory airstrikes by NATO for the kidnapping of UNPROFOR
personnel.
C. Reports of the Special Rapporteur: A Critique of U.N. Efforts
U.N. efforts to restore peace and security in Bosnia have
been criticized in the reports of the Commission on Human
Rights' Special Rapporteur on the situation in the former Yugo-
slavia. Because the Special Rapporteur is the primary authority
upon whom the Commission on Human Rights, General Assem-
bly, Security Council, and Secretary General rely in formulating
measures to deal with the human rights violations in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia, his analysis of the effectiveness of the
United Nations in addressing human rights violations must be
given great significance. On February 21, 1994, the Special Rap-
porteur issued his sixth periodic report on the situation of
human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in which
he restates the primary recommendations contained in previous
reports and analyzes their implementation.2 78 He examined the
commission of ethnic cleansing, the interception of humanita-
rian aid, the unlawful imprisonment of persons within detention
275. I& at 2, 1 1.
276. Roger Cohen, Serbian Helicopter Rights Are One More Sign of Bosnia's Woes, N.Y.
TuMEs, Feb. 6, 1995, at A3 [hereinafter Serbian Helicopter Flights]; Barabara Crossette,
United Nations Reports Serbian Helicopter Sorties in Bosnia, a Violation of Right Ban, N.Y.
TMEs, Feb. 8, 1995, at A12 [hereinafter United Nations Reports Serbian Helicopter Sorties];
Barabara Crossette, U.N. Suspects Serbia ofAiding Serbs in Bosnia, N.Y. TiES, Feb. 9, 1995,
at A10 [hereinafter Aiding Serbs in Bosnia].
277. Yugoslav Path Cited For Missiles at Bihac, N.Y. TMEs, Dec. 10, 1994, at A7.
278. See Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 43-44 (presenting Special Rapporteur's
main recommendations for addressing human rights violations and analysis of their
follow-up).
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camps and centers, the commission of war crimes and U.N. ef-
forts to prosecute perpetrators, and the administration of U.N.
safe areas.279
1. Ethnic Cleansing
The Special Rapporteur identified "ethnic cleansing" as an
organized purge of the civilian population according to ethnic
criteria in order to force that population to abandon the terri-
tory it occupies.280 In light of this tactic, the Special Rapporteur
concluded that the United Nations must uphold two inviolable
principles: (1) a right of return to their homes for all refugees
and, (2) that there should be no recognition of any transfer of
property made under duress or acquired by force.28' After re-
counting the numerous resolutions that were passed by the Se-
curity Council and the General Assembly embracing these two
principles, the Special Rapporteur observed that the Bosnian
Serb policy of "ethnic cleansing" had continued unabated
throughout the entire period of his mandate.8 2 The Special
Rapporteur also concluded that, although Bosnian Serb authori-
ties initiated the policy of ethnic cleansing, the international
community's inadequate reaction prompted other sides to use
the same methods.28 8
The Special Rapporteur received repeated assurances from
the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Interna-
tional Conference on the Former Yugoslavia ("ICFY'), that, the
validity of property taken by force would not be recognized.28 4
The Special Rapporteur warned that the international commu-
nity's repeated assertions that ethnic cleansing would not be tol-
erated were insignificant unless accompanied by measures to en-
force those assertions.2 5 The Special Rapporteur observed that
as a consequence of his warnings going unheeded, the situation
deteriorated to such an extent that the Co-Chairmen of the
Steering Committee of the ICFY felt compelled to plan for the
279. Id. at 44-50. The term "safe areas" refers to communities that were desig-
nated as areas to be protected by UNPROFOR against attack. Id. at 46. Srebrenica,
Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Bihac and Gorazde were all designated as U.N. "safe areas." Id
280. Id. at 44.
281. I&
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partition of Bosnia and the permanent transfer of popula-
tions.2"6 The Special Rapporteur also concluded that the pro-
gress of events leading towards the partition of Bosnia was identi-
fiable and preventable, yet the international community made
"no serious attempt" to avoid this.2"'
2. Humanitarian Aid
The Special Rapporteur recommended an increase in the
delivery of humanitarian assistance to all persons in the areas of
Bosnia affected by the conflict, and the creation of "humanita-
rian relief corridors" to provide an effective means of protecting
aid convoys. 2 8 : In light of the U.N.'s efforts, the Special Rap-
porteur noted 'that the failure to create protected corridors led
to frequent and lengthy delays at Bosnian Serb and other check-
points.28 9 UNPROFOR's failure to protect these aid convoys al-
lowed the convoys to be used as political tools by the Bosnian
Serbs and Bosnian Croats. 290
3. Prisoners and Detainees
The Special Rapporteur recommended that the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") be granted full ac-
cess to all detention camps and centers. 291 The Special Rap-
porteur observed that, although access had been granted to
many detention camps, summary executions, severe beatings,
rapes and torture, and other deplorable conditions contin-
286. d.
287. Id. The Special Rapporteur's concluding observations provide a final critique
of the international community's conduct during the period in which he was mandated
to report on the situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia:
The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in particular in Bosnia and Herze-
govina have once again proved that human rights only play a secondary role in
the context of international politics. A number of formal steps which have
been undertaken may be considered as a substitute or excuse for political iner-
tia ... The international community has, defacto, tolerated massive violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law. Such a policy under-
mines some of the most fundamental principles upon which international law
and the system of human rights protection have been built.
Id. at 54.
288. Id. at 46.
289. Id. at 47.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 48.
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ued 92 The Special Rapporteur also called for the release of
prisoners and detainees. 3  While some camps had since been
closed, the Special Rapporteur noted that many thousands of
people remained prisoners or detainees in violation of the
Fourth Geneva Convention.294
4. War Crimes
The Special Rapporteur recommended that a commission
of experts be established to investigate violations of international
human rights law, and that violators of international human
rights law be prosecuted.2 95 Heeding the Special Rapporteur's
recommendation, the Security Council created such a commis-
sion of experts, in addition to an International Tribunal to pros-
ecute violators of international human rights law.296 The Special
Rapporteur, however, criticized the inadequate financial and or-
ganizational support appropriated the commission of experts,
and concluded that additional resources were required in order
to allow the International Tribunal to effectively carry out its
mandate.29 7
5. "Safe Areas"
The Special Rapporteur recommended the creation of "se-
curity zones" within Bosnia for the protection of displaced per-
sons.298 The Special Rapporteur concluded that the "safe areas"
created were overcrowded, short of basic food and medical re-
sources, and vulnerable to shelling and military attacks. These
conditions led the Special Rapporteur to comment that the "safe
areas" were "'safe' only on paper."299
D. United Nations Response to Recent Developments in Bosnia




295. Id. at 48-49.
296. Id.
297. Id.; International Tribunal, supra note 248, arts. 1-10, at 36-39. The Interna-
tional Tribunal is mandated to prosecute persons responsible for violating the Geneva
Convention, the Genocide Convention, violations of the laws or customs of war, and
crimes against humanity. Id. arts. 1-5, at 36-38.
298. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 46.
299. Id.
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Serb forces, aided by Croatian Serb forces, launched an assault
on the "safe area" of Bihac.s°° The city of Bihac, due to the mass
influx of displaced persons, has swollen to a population of ap-
proximately 70,000 civilians.8 0' The residents of Bihac have lived
under siege throughout the war, and have been constantly sub-
jected to the random shelling of the inner city by Bosnian Serbs
positioned on neighboring hilltops."0 2 In an effort to root out a
division of the Bosnian Government army, "V Corps," the Bos-
nian Serb forces launched a full-scale assault on the safe area.303
These assaults continue to challenge the authority and ability of
the United Nations to provide for the protection of civilians who
sought refuge in this U.N. protected area. 4
In response to this crisis, the United Nations drew a prover-
bial line in the sand, and threatened that if the Bosnian Serb
offensive reached the border of the safe area, NATO airstrikes
would be ordered.0 5 The Bosnian Serb forces ignored the U.N.
threats, and, in fact, escalated their offensive by dropping
napalm and cluster bombs on residential neighborhoods from
fixed-wing aircraft.30 6 The flight of the aircraft originated in the
Serb held area of Croatia, Krajina.307 Shortly thereafter, the Bos-
nian Serbs kidnapped and held hostage UNPROFOR personnel
stationed in Bihac to discourage retaliatory NATO airstrikes.308
300. Michael R. Gordon, Conflict in the Balkans: ThePolicy, N.Y. TrmES, Dec. 4, 1994,
at Al [hereinafter Balkan Conflict Policy]; see Paul Quin-Judge, US Reaching for Clarity on
Bosnia Policy, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1994, at 2 (concluding that elements of Yugoslav
Army crossed into Croatia to free up Croatian Serb units for battle around Bihac);
Roger Cohen, Serbs Press Drive On Bosnian Town, Using Helicopter, N.Y. TiMs, Nov. 23,
1994, at Al (concluding that attack has been clearly and fully coordinated between
Croatian and Bosnian Serbs) [hereinafter Serbs Using Helicopters].
301. Balkan Conflict Policy, supra note 300, at Al.
302. See Serbs Using Helicopters, supra note 300, at Al; U.N. and NATO Unable to Act,
supra note 111, at Al.
303. Id.
304. Conflict in the Balkains, supra note 8, at Al.
305. Serbs Using Helieopters, supra note 300, at Al.
306. Tenth Report, supra note 157, at 7;John Pomfret, Bombed Croatian Serb Airfield
Repaired and Possibly in Use, WASH. PosT, Dec. 5, 1994, at A25 (reporting Serb use of
napalm and cluster bombs against Muslims in Bihac region); Roger Cohen, NATO, Fx-
panding Bosnia Role, Strikes a Serbian Base in Croatia, N.Y. TlA s, Nov. 22, 1994, at Al
(reporting use of napalm and cluster bombs in Serb attack on Bihac region).
307. Chuck Sudetic, Jet Attacks Bosnian Town, N.Y. TRMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at A8.
308. Roger Cohen, Serbs Close in on Bosnian Town, N.Y. TrmEs, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al;
World Mediators Tying to Get Bosnian Muslims to Accept Peace Proposal, DAUAs MoRNING
NEws, Nov. 30, 1994, at IA; see Serbs Using Helicopters, supra note 300, at Al (reporting
U.N. troop shortages of food and weapons in Bihac due to Bosnian Serbs).
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The United Nations responded to the Serb disregard of its
ultimatum by requesting NATO airstrikes on the airfield from
which the bombing raids had originated-a 9 NATO, however,
was instructed to exclude the following targets: aircraft, muni-
tions dumps, command headquarters, and heavy weapons posi-
tions110 NATO was only authorized to bomb the airfield itself,
which rendered that particular airstrip inoperative for a matter
of hours."' The Serb forces responded to the NATO airstrikes
by firing SAMs at warplanes passing overhead, and threatening
further retaliation."1 2 The Bosnian and Croatian Serbs methodi-
cally continued to consolidate their control over the city of
Bihac.3 13 U.N. commanders on the ground in Bihac repeatedly
submitted requests to their superiors for airstrikes to protect
their positions in the city, and to repel Bosnian and Croatian
Serb advances.31 4 These requests were denied.315 NATO offi-
cials asserted that U.N. commanders refused requests for air-
strikes because they feared the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs
would retaliate against their peacekeepers. 1 6
By December 9, 1994, the United Nations had abandoned
the threat of force as a means of pressuring the Bosnian Serb
forces into compliance with existing Security Council resolutions
and participating in settlement negotiations in good faith. 317
Consequently, the Serb forces continued their mortar and artil-
lery attacks on Bihac.318 Shortly after the United Nations aban-
doned the threat of force to deter attacks against "safe havens,"
309. Roger Cohen, NATO, Expanding Role Strikes a Serbian Base in Croatia, N.Y.
TMEs, Nov. 22, 1994, at Al.
310. See Balkan Conflict Policy, supra note 300, at Al (discussing NATO targets).
311. Id. Since the NATO bombing raid, Udbina airfield has been used to launch
aircraft destined for Bosnia. Roger Cohen, A Fragile Truce in Bosnia: No Will or No Way,
N.Y. TwMs, Jan. 19, 1995, at A3 (reporting Udbina airfield as origin of 20 helicopter
sorties resupplying Serbian positions around Bihac).
312. Serbs Using Helicopters, supra note 300, at Al.
313. World Mediators Tiying to Get Bosnian Muslims to Accept Peace Proposal, supra note
308, at IA.
314. Michael R. Gordon, Britain Cool to French Plan to Step Up UN. Bosnia Effort, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1994, at A10.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Thoughts About Bosnia, supra note 7, at A12; Roger Cohen, Bosnia Truce Frayed
by Fighting and Disputes, N.Y. TPmms, Jan. 17, 1995, at A4.
318. A Cease-Fire Called Winter, supra note 259, at A12; see Bosnia Truce Frayed by
Fighting and Disputes, supra note 317, at A4 (reporting continued Serbian shelling of
town center of Bihac).
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however, former U.S. PresidentJimmy Carter went to Bosnia and
negotiated a four-month cease-fire agreement ("cease-fire") be-
tween the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serb authorities.3 19
The cease-fire took effect on January 1, 1995.320 Although
the cease-fire was initially successful in reducing the level of
fighting across Bosnia, 21 when peace negotiations between the
Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serb authorities stalled, it
rapidly began to unravel.3 2 2 In disregard of the cease-fire, Ser-
bian forces continued their assault against Bihac, and escalated
their offensive in early February with the aid of 1000 new Ser-
bian fighters from Croatia.3 23 Meanwhile, sixty-two Serbian heli-
copter sorties flew from Serbia into eastern Bosnia on what ap-
peared to be military resupply missions3 24 in violation of the
U.N. flight-ban over Bosnia.3 25 Throughout Bosnia, the parties
recognized the impending failure of the cease-fire and intensi-
fied their preparations for renewed fighting. 2 6
III. THE FAILURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO RESTORE
I"NTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY VIOLATES
BOSNIA'S ARTICLE 51 RIGHT TO SELF-
DEFENSE
Article 51 must be interpreted to guarantee member states a
319. Serbs Call Shots, supra note 7, § 1, at 3.
320. Stephen Kinzer, Cease.Fire in Bosnia Starts, and Sides Meet on Details, N.Y. TimS,
Jan. 2, 1995, § 1, at 3. The agreement called for the two armies to pull their troops back
from the front lines, and, in some areas, U.N. troops were to serve as a buffer between
them. Stephen Kinzer, Bosnian Muslims and Serbs Agree to Four-Month Truce, N.Y. TimEs,
Jan. 1, 1995, § 1, at 8.
321. Cease-Fire in Bosnia Starts, and Sides Meet on Details, supra note 320, § 1, at 3.
322. Fighting Erodes Cease-Fre, supra note 8, at A8.
323. Id. Over the weekend of February 11-12, 1995, approximately 1500 rounds of
tank, artillery and mortar fire rained down on the Bihac region, including the direct
Serbian shelling of the town of Bihac. Id. According to the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees, on February 8, 1995, food supplies were running desperately low for the
180,000 residents of the Bihac region. United Nations Reports Serbian Helicopter Sorties,
supra note 276, at A12.
324. United Nations Reports Serbian Helicopter Sorties, supra note 276, at A12; see Ser-
bian Helicopier lights, supra note 276, at A3 (reporting initial detection of helicopter
flights and assumption as military resupply); Aiding Serbs in Bosnia, supra note 276, at
A10 (reporting repeated denial of U.N. observer access to monitoring radar).
325. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing military flight ban
within Bosnia imposed by Resolution 781); Resolution 781, supra note 235, at 2, 1 1.
326. A Fragile Truce in Bosnia: No Will or No Way, supra note 311, at AS. The terms
of the cease-fire called for the Bosnian Serbs to restore utilities in Sarajevo, but the city
continued to be virtually without gas in freezing temperatures. Id.
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right to self-defense that cannot be terminated until the Security
Council takes measures that restore international peace and se-
curity, and protect the member state from armed attack.
Human rights violations serve as a barometer for measuring
whether international peace and security has been restored, or if
effective steps have been taken towards that end. Since the Se-
curity Council has failed to effectively enforce its resolutions,
thereby permitting the continued widespread violation of
human rights, it has failed to restore international peace and
security. The Security Council's failure to restore international
peace and security does not satisfy the Article 51 criteria for ter-
minating a state's right to self-defense. Therefore the Security
Council must rescind the arms embargo against Bosnia, 2 ' and
permit Bosnia to exercise its Article 51 right to self-defense.3 28
A. Article 51: A Safeguard Against Collective Abandonment
Accepting the ICJ interpretation of what constitutes an
armed attack 29 for purposes of applying Article 51, the Republic
of Bosnia-Herzegovina has suffered repeated and continuous
"armed attacks" by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro).330 Throughout the last three years, the Bos-
nian government has repeatedly declared that it was under at-
tack, and requested that the international community lift the Se-
curity Council-mandated arms embargo.331 The Bosnian govern-
ment, therefore, has met all the criteria defined in Nicaragua v.
327. Resolution 713, supra note 3, at 3, 1 6.
328. U.N. CHARTm art. 51.
329. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes "armed
attack" for interpreting Article 51). The Court, quoting from Article 3, paragraph (g)
of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX),
held that:
"armed attack" means "the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to" (inter alla) an actual armed
attack conducted by regular forces, "or its substantial involvement therein
Nicaragua, 1986 I.CJ. at 93.
330. General Assembly Resolution 48/88, supra note 9, at 3, 15 (condemning con-
tinued supply of military arms, equipment and services to Bosnian Serb paramilitary
units by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)); General Assembly
Resolution 49/10, supra note 9, at 1-6, pmbl., I1 5, 13, 15.
331. See U.N. Admits Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia, supra note 100, at A6 (reporting
Bosnian Foreign Minister requesting U.N. assistance in defending Bosnia); supra note
100 and accompanying text (reporting Bosnian government lobbying for unilateral lift-
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U.S. for exercising its Article 51 right to self-defense. 3 2 Having
determined that the Bosnian government is qualified to invoke
the Article 51 right to self-defense,;3 " the question becomes
whether the Security Council's attempts to restore international
peace and security satisfy the Article 51 criteria for terminating
that right.3 3 4 To determine what criteria the Security Council
must satisfy before terminating a member state's Article 51 right
to self-defense, the second clause of Article 51 must be inter-
preted according to the four schools of treaty interpretation. 35
The systematic school of interpretation, however, must be
discarded because in cases where a treaty has been drafted over
many years, the meaning of words may have changed between
earlier articles and later ones. 3 6 Similarly, the teleological
school of interpretation causes problems because, in looking to
the purpose of the treaty over time, it forces courts to legislate
rather than to judge. 3 Interpretations using the textual and
intentional schools, however, yield more conservative and con-
structive interpretations."'
In Resolution 713, the Security Council determined that the
fighting in the former Yugoslavia, causing a heavy loss of life and
ing of arms embargo if U.N. efforts fail to compel Bosnian Serb acceptance of peace
plan).
332. Nicaragua, 1986 I.CJ. 14; see supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing requirements, as established by ICJ, for states invoking Article 51 right to exer-
cise self-defense).
333. See supra notes 95-100 and accomanying text (establishing test for invoking
Article 51 right to self-defense); General Assembly Resolution 48/88, supra note 9, at 1-
5, pmbl., 11 4-5, 17-18 (determining Bosnia's right as member of United Nations to
invoke Article 51 and exercise self-defense, and urging Security Council to exempt Bos-
nia from arms embargo); General Assembly Resolution 49/10, supra note 9, at 1-4, 6-7,
pmbl., 11 22-23 (reaffirming Bosnia's right to invoke Article 51 and exercise self-de-
fense, and, once again, urging Security Council to exempt Bosnia from arms embargo).
334. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing clause of Artricle 51 pro-
viding for Security Council's termination of Article 51 right to self-defense).
335. 1 SCuwARz BERGER, supra note 103 and accompanying text (introducing
four methods of treaty interpretation).
336. See id. at 153-54; supra notes 94, 98 (presenting systematic school of treaty
interpretation).
337. See id. at 154 (presenting teleological school of treaty interpretation); supra
note 110 and accompanying text (discussing teleological school as requiring judges to
evaluate treaty purposes over time, shifting their role from traditional judicial interpre-
tation to discovering or legislating new interpretations of treaties).
338. 1 D.P. O'ComEL, INmA-inoNA. LAW 271-74 (1965) (advocating use of in-
tentional school for treaty interpretation); L. OPPENHIM, IN-NurNxAroNa. LAw-. A Ta.A-
TiSE 952-53 (8th ed. 1955) (advocating use of textual and intentional schools for inter-
preting treaties).
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material damage, constituted a threat to international peace and
security.339 In light of the Resolution 713 definition of what con-
stitutes a threat to international peace and security, the wide-
spread fighting that continues to cause a heavy loss of life and
property damage within Bosnia must not qualify as international
peace and security.3 40 The Security Council's equation of inter-
national peace and security with an absence of heavy fighting
should equally apply to an absence of massive human rights vio-
lations.3 41 Therefore, the Special Rapporteur's report that ram-
pant, unabated human rights violations continue throughout
the territory of Bosnia illustrates that international peace and
security has not been restored. 42 The meaning of "measures
necessary" is, therefore, the only question remaining.3 43
1. Textual Interpretation
Applying the textual school of interpretation to "measures
necessary" requires a determination of the plain meaning of
these words.344 According to Webster's Dictionary, "measures nec-
essary" means "acts essential." 4" Having determined the plain
meaning of "measures necessary," this phrase must be examined
in relation to its immediate context.3 46 When "measures neces-
sary" is examined in the immediate context of Article 51, the
qualification of a member state's inherent right to self-defense is
339. Resolution 713, supra note 3. at 1-2, pmbl.
340. Id. In Resolution 713, the Security Council concluded that fighting which
causes a heavy loss of life and property damage constitutes a threat to international
peace and security. Id.
341. Id.; see General Assembly Resolution 49/10, supra note 9, at 1-4, pmbl. (de-
claring that continued armed hostilities and aggression are threats to international
peace and security); General Assembly Resolution 48/88, supra note 9, at 1-3, pmbl.
(declaring Bosnia's right to invoke Article 51 right to self-defense and condemning
Bosnian Serb practice of ethnic cleasning).
342. Tenth Report, supra note 157, at 11-12; Ninth Report, supra note 157, at 6, 20-21.
343. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing textual interpretation
as utilizing "plain meaning" reading).
344. 1 SCHWAIZENBERGER, supra note 103, at 153 (presenting textual school of in-
terpretation); supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing how textual school
reads words to have their usual, everyday, meaning unless used for technical purposes);
L. OPPENHEiM, supra note 107, at 952.
345. See WEBStR'S NEw TWrNTmH CENTURy DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 1115 (2d ed. 1980). "Measure" is defined as "an act, step, or proceeding
designed for the accomplishment of an object." Id "Necessary" is defined as "essen-
tial," "unavoidable," and "indispensable." Id. at 1200.
346. 1 SCHWARZENDRGER, supra note 103, at 153.
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not precluded until the Security Council has taken the "acts es-
sential" to maintain international peace and security.3 47
2. Intentional Interpretation
An intentional interpretation of "measures necessary" looks
to the intent of the parties at the time of signing. 34  Customary
international law has always recognized the right to act in self-
defense as an inherent right of every sovereign state.3 49 Article
51, the only exception to the prohibition of the "use of force" by
individual members in Article 2 (4), merely represents the codifi-
cation of this pre-existing right under customary international
law.350 Recognizing that the intended purpose of Article 51 was
to guarantee states the right to protect themselves from armed
attack, the Security Council can only deny a member state the
right to individual or collective self-defense when the Security
Council itself provides protection.35 1 "Measures necessary" must,
therefore, be read as measures that are "adequate" or "suffi-
cient" to maintain international peace and security. 52
B. Massive Violations of International Human Rights Conventions
Constitute Absence of International Peace and Security
The conflict in Bosnia has been characterized by grave and
pervasive violations of international human rights conven-
tions.3 5 While recognizing that all parties to the conflict have
engaged in human rights violations, the Bosnian Serb forces'
orchestrated campaign of ethnic cleansing has inflicted human
suffering in Bosnia, on a scale not comparable to the other par-
ties.354 Because the Bosnian Serb policy of ethnic cleansing en-
347. U.N. CHARTER art. 51; supra note 86 and accompanying text (presenting full
text of Article 51 and recognizing it as sole exception to Article 2(4) prohibition on use
of force).
348. 1 ScHwARzmERGER, supra note 103, at 154.
349. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 84; see supra note 90 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing 1.CJ. holding that self-defense constitutes customary international law that pre-
dates Article 51).
350. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 84.
351. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures nec-
essary to maintain international peace and security.").
352. I&
353. Ninth Report, supra note 157, at 20; First Report, supra note 112, at 11.
354. Report on Human Rights, supra note 112, at 57; see Seventh Report, supra note 17,
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compasses an amalgam of terror tactics and violence inflicted
against non-Serb ethnic communities, it violates numerous inter-
national human rights conventions, 55 including: (1) the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 56 (2) the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment,3 5 7 (3) the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 ' (4)
the Geneva Convention, 59 and (5) the Genocide Convention.3 6 0
The use of systematic rape 36  and forced impregnation of
non-Serb women3 62 to ethnically cleanse territory3 63 violates
both Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All
at 4 (reporting Bosnian Serb massive violations of human rights as not comparable to
violations committed by government forces); Ninth Report, supra note 157, at 20-21 (re-
porting current campaign of Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing as largest since height of
conflict).
355. Report on Human Rights, supra note 112, at 55-57.
356. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, supra note 118, art. 1, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16, 19 I.L.M. at 36.
357. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, supra note 122, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 at 3, 1991 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 107 at 3.
358. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 127, arts. 19, 34, 37(a),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 at 10, 16, 17, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 44 at 7, 11, 12.
359. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 147, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 39 at 216; see
Report on Human Rights, supra note 112, at 56. The Special Rapporteur suggested that
ethnic cleansing might violate the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War. Id.
360. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
supra note 142, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, 1970 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 at 4.
361. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 51; see William Drozdiak, Serbs Raped 20, 000, EC
Team Says, supra note 202, at A12, A17 (discussing widespread rape by Serb forces).
362. 2 H-LsNKi WATCH, WAt CRIMEs IN BoSNIA AN HERZEGOVINA 21-22 (1993). A
team of experts sent by the Human Rights Commission collected testimony that indi-
cated that the practice of forced impregnation was widespread among Bosnian Serb
forces. Report on Human Rights, supra note 112, annex II, at 70-71. The report reads, in
part-
Another ethnic Croat woman was detained in a 'special house' where she was
raped by several men every night for approximately two months.... She re-
ported'that, while raping her, the men were shouting: 'you will have a Serbian
child.' She also reported being told that, if she were pregnant, she would be
'forced to stay there until six months of pregnancy.'
I .
363. Report on Human Rights, supra note 112, annex II, at 74.
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Forms of Discrimination Against Women,"6 and Article 1 of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment. 65 Rape is both a violation of
a woman's right to be free from discrimination based on gender,
and a form of torture. 66 Consequently, the pervasive sexual
abuse of women and girls throughout Bosnia constitutes massive
violations of these conventions. 67 As part of their campaign of
ethnic cleansing, Bosnian Serb forces have also employed rape,
and other forms of violence, against minors in violation of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.3t
The use of terror and violence to ethnically cleanse territory
of civilian populations constitutes a violation of the Geneva
Convention. 369 The subjection of civilians to summary execu-
tion, mutilation, beatings, and rape, the typical practices of eth-
nic cleansing,3 70 violate Article 3(1) (a) of the Geneva Conven-
tion. 31 The rampant shelling of civilian population centers, 72
364. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, supra note 118, art. 1, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 16, 19 I.L.M. at 36.
365. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, supra note 122, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 at 3, 1991 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 107 at 3.
366. Id.
367. Sixth Report, supra note 157, at 13; Fifth Report, supra note 157, at 5; see
Drozdiak, Serbs Raped 20,000, EC Team Says, supra note 202, at A12, A17. The EC report
concluded that rape was being committed throughout Bosnia on a massive scale, not as
random attacks, but as part of a deliberate campaign of ethnic cleansing. Id.
368. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 127, arts. 19(1), 27(1),
34, 37(a), 37(b), 38(4), U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 at 10, 14, 16-18, 1992 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 44 at 7, 10-12 (presenting articles that are violated by ethnic cleansing of children);
supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text (discussing James Grant's letter expressing
distress at widespread abuse of children in Bosnia).
369. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 147, art. 3(1), 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 39 at 216;
see supra note 149 and accompanying text (providing and discussing language of Article
3(1)). In Resolution 764, the Security Council reaffirmed that all parties were bound to
comply with the Geneva Convention. S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, at 1 10, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/764 (1992).
370. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (defining and discussing practice
of ethnic cleansing).
371. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 147, art. 3(1)(a), 75 U.N.T.S. at 290, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 39 at 216;
see supra note 102 and accompanying text (presenting text of Article 3 (1) (a) of Geneva
Convention).
372. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing Bosnian Serb forces'
massive shelling of Sarajevo); Seventh Report, supra note 17, at 1-4 (reporting Bosnian
Serb offensive against enclave of Gorazde and associated civilian casualties and suffer-
ing).
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intentional interruption of water and electrical services, and the
hijacking of food and humanitarian aid deliveries 73 illustrate
the grave and pervasive violation of this convention2 74 Addition-
ally, the use of rape as an instrument for degrading women and
coercing their departure from territory violates Article 3(1) (c)
of the Geneva Convention. 375
The ethnic cleansing of a religious or ethnic community
with the intent to destroy that community violates the Genocide
Convention. 76  The Bosnian Serb forces' use of ethnic cleans-
ing against Bosnian Muslims, to the extent that the Bosnian Mus-
lim community is in danger of being exterminated, 77 constitutes
genocide under the Genocide Convention.378 Similarly, ethni-
cally motivated killing, sexual mutilation, and other violent
forms of torture and harassment intended to make life unbear-
able violate the Genocide Convention. 79 In addition, forced im-
pregnation of women also violates the Genocide Convention.3 8 0
In sum, ethnic cleansing, the policy of massacring and terror-
izing populations to achieve ethnic homogeneity, epitomizes ge-
nocide as defined by the Genocide Convention. 81
The Security Council recognized the prevalence of human
rights violations in Bosnia and, subsequent to Resolution 713,
adopted resolutions mandating that parties respect international
human rights conventions. 3 2 The Special Rapporteur's most re-
373. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing shortages of aid sup-
plies due to hijacking and blockading).
374. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 147, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90, 1958 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 39 at 216.
375. Report on Human Rights, supra note 112, annex II, at 73-74.
376. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
supra note 142, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, 1970 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 at 4; see supra note
143 and accompanying text (providing text of Genocide Convention Article II).
377, See supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing danger of Bosnian Mus-
lim extermination as consequence of ethnic cleansing).
378. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
supra note 142, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, 1970 Cr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 at 4.
379. Id.; see supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing U.N. International
Tribunal indictment of Serbian concentration camp commander for commission of ge-
nocide).
380. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
supra note 142, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, 1970 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 at 4. The Article
11(d) prohibition against preventing births within a group should be deemed violated
when a woman is forced to give birth to a child of another group. Id.
381. Id. art. II.
382. Resolution 771, supra note 225, at 1,11 1-5; Resolution 798, supra note 231, at
1, pmbl.; Resolution 819, supra note 241, at 1-3, pmbl., 11 7-8; Resolution 824, supra
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cent reports, however, document the continued commission of
massive human rights violations in Bosnia. 8 - Therefore, at the
time of the Special Rapporteur's last report the Security Council
had not yet restored international peace and security in Bosnia,
as required by Article 51.84
C. Evidence of the United Nations' Failure: The Continuation of
Massive Human Rights Violations
The United Nations' failure to protect the safe area of Bihac
from Bosnian Serb attack epitomizes the inability of the United
Nations to suppress the continued commission of human rights
violations, and thereby restore international peace and security
in Bosnia. 85 Immediately after this public display of impotence
and discord, the United Nations abandoned the threat of force
as a means of pressuring the Bosnian Serb forces to comply with
Security Council resolutions. 8 6 Instead, the United Nations
elected to pursue a political settlement to the conflict exclusively
through dialogue. 87
While the ensuing cease-fire agreement temporarily re-
duced the level of fighting in Bosnia, the safe area of Bihac has
been subjected to an unrelenting assault.388 Serb forces are cur-
rently subjecting 180,000 predominantly Muslim civilians in the
note 244, at 1-2, pmbl.; Resolution 827, supra note 247, at 2, 1 2; Resolution 836, supra
note 250, at 1-2, pmbl.
383. Tenth Report, supra note 157, at 11-12; Ninth Report, at 20-21; Eighth Report,
supra note 157, at 6-7; Seventh Report, supra note 17, at 1-4.
384. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (presenting text of Article 51 and
recognizing its role as sole exception to Article 2(4) general prohibition on use of
force).
385. Conflict in the Balkans, supa note 8, at Al. The episode of finger-pointing to
assign blame between the United Nations and NATO for the meager military response
to the Bosnian and Croatian Serb attacks, and the de facto abandonment of Bihac as a
safe area, led U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry to conclude that NATO and the
United Nations were powerless to reverse the Bosnian Serb gains. Michael R. Gordon,
Serbs' Gains Irreversible Perry Asserts, N.Y. TmEs, Nov. 28, 1994, at All; ichael R.
Gordon, Britain Cool to French Plan to Step Up U.N. Bosnia Effort, supra note 314, at A10.
386. Thoughts About Bosnia, supra note 7, at A12; Roger Cohen, Bosnia Truce Frayed
by Fighting and Disputes, sup-a note 317, at A4.
387. A Fragile Truce in Bosnia: No Will or No Way, supra note 311, at A3.
388. Cease-Fr in Bosnia Starts, and Sides Meet on Details, N.Y. TbMES, supra note 320,
§ 1, at 3; Bosnia Truce Frayed by Fighting and Disputes, supra note 317, at A4; A Fragile
Truce: No Will or No Way, sup-a note 311, at AS; World News Brief, Mediators Break Off
Mission in Bosnia, N.Y. TnMS, Jan. 26, 1995, atA2; Accord Takes Effect, Allowing Sarajevans
to Leave the Capital, N.Y. Tnexs, Feb. 7, 1995, at A7; FightingErodes Cease-Fre, supra note 8,
at A8.
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Bihac area389 to direct shelling, sniper attacks, and a deprivation
of food and medicines. 9 ' This conduct demonstrates the con-
tinued violation of both the Geneva Convention 9' and the Ge-
nocide Convention. 92 Furthermore, the lack of response by the
United Nations to the flight ban violation by helicopter sorties
used to resupply the Serbian positions conducting the offensive
against Bihac illustrates the failure of the Security Council to en-
force its resolutions. 9 3 Indeed, when sixty-two helicopter sorties
flew from Serbia into eastern Bosnia on military resupply mis-
sions, the United Nations again failed to respond. 94 These fail-
ures of the Security Council to enforce its resolutions, and
thereby prevent the commission of massive human rights viola-
tions, demonstrate the continuing inability of the Security Coun-
cil to take the measures necessary to restore international peace
and security in Bosnia.395
CONCLUSION
The absence of international peace and security in Bosnia,
evidenced by continuing reports of massive human rights viola-
389. United Nations Reports Serbian Helicopter Sorties in Bosnia, supra note 276, at A12.
390. See supra notes 300-02 and accompanying text (discussing subjection of resi-
dents of Bihac region to constant attacks and accompanying deprivations).
391. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing prohibited acts
under Geneva Convention).
392. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing prohibited conduct
under Genocide convention).
393. A Fragile Truce in Bosnia: No Will or No Way, supra note 311, at A3.
394. United Nations Reports Serbian Helicopter Sorties in Bosnia, supra note 276, at A12.
395. U.N. CHATaR art. 51. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the in-
herent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures nec-
essary to maintain international peace and security." I& The political statements of the
international community provide the best gauge as to whether the Security Council's
measures, in the form of resolutions, have been given enough time to have their in-
tended effect. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (indicating international com-
munity's dissatisfaction with Security Council's efforts to implement its resolutions). In
the form of General Assembly Resolutions, the international community has expressed
its dissatisfaction with the performance of the Security Council, and has reflected its
lack of confidence in the Security Council's ability to enforce its resolutions. General
Assembly Resolution 48/88, supra note 9, at 1-5, pmbl., 1 5, 12, 15, 17; General Assem-
bly Resolution 49/10, supra note 9, at 1-4, 6, pmbl., 11 17-19, 21-22; see Provisional
Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Forty-Seventh Meeting,
supra note 9, at 1-149 (calling for Security Council to exempt Bosnia from arms em-
bargo for purpose of allowing Bosnia to exercise its inherent right to self-defense). The
vote of the Security Council, six in favor, none against, and nine abstaining, was insuffi-
cient to adopt the draft Resolution. Id. at 148.
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tions, demonstrates that the Security Council has failed to satisfy
the Article 51 criteria authorizing the termination of Bosnia's
right to self-defense. Having failed to meet this criteria, the Se-
curity Council must rescind those resolutions that impede Bos-
nia's ability to exercise self-defense. Resolution 713 represents
the greatest impediment to Bosnia's ability to exercise self-de-
fense, and must be rescinded. Furthermore, the U.N.'s failure
to take the measures necessary to restore international peace
and security in Bosnia, has compromised its credibility, and has
undermined its ability to respond to future conflicts.
